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Russia consistently exploits ethnic divides in its foreign policy strategy, 
specifically against states in its “near abroad.” Georgia and Ukraine have been on the 
receiving end of this strategy for most of their post-Soviet history. As a result, the 
sovereignty of both has been systematically and repeatedly violated by Russia. 
A comparative study of Georgia and Ukraine, two countries that share a unique 
historical relationship with Russia but are now ideologically moving outside its orbit, 
permits a more nuanced view into two distinctive aspects of Russia’s exploitation of 
ethnic divisions: Georgia as an ancient and unique nation located in the crossroads of 
three continents, and Ukraine as a fellow Slavic country with a shared Russian history 
fighting to create its own identity. 
Russia’s efforts to exploit ethnic divides fall into six categories: exporting 
propaganda, manipulating identity, arming insurgents, supplying fighters, exploiting 
presence, and freezing conflicts. Though Russia has successfully weakened Georgia and 
Ukraine through these six strategic methods, Russia has struggled to achieve its long-
term goals of limiting Western influence, creating a Russian hegemony, and restoring 
Russia to great-power status. In pursuing these goals, Russia not only irreparably 
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but know this...I stand with the Ukrainian and Georgian people. In my research I have 
been moved by the plight and struggle these nations have suffered in their respective wars 
against numerous destabilizing forces. Both countries face threats that the world cannot 
ignore, and we, as the West, have abandoned the proud people of the steppe and 
Caucasus. Now it is too late, politically at least, to provide decisive assistance to these 
citizens, but what we can do is deny further opportunities to distort and destroy their 
sense of identity. I wish anyone who reads this thesis will come to better understand what 








At [the] bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is [a] 
traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. 
—George Kennan, Long Telegram 
 
A visitor to the Republic of Georgia’s capital, Tbilisi, would see little indication 
of the country’s history of ethnic conflict. The city embodies the dynamic character of the 
Georgian people: they have rejuvenated Tbilisi, restoring cultural sites and a revitalizing 
a vibrant tourist sector. Its people are welcoming and friendly, as well as eager to be 
perceived as modern and European. But outside the capital, the harsher truth of Georgia’s 
existence comes into focus. Its infrastructure is in disrepair, its economy still heavily 
dependent on agriculture, and its territorial integrity at risk. Despite almost a quarter 
century of independence, large swaths of Georgia is occupied and divided, primarily 
along ethnic lines. Ethnic Ossetian and Abkhazian minorities hold sway over large 
portions of the country’s north and northwest, supported diplomatically, militarily, and 
economically by the Russian Federation. These ethnic minorities fought two wars—one 
in the early 1990s and a second in 2008, both supported by Russia—to gain their current 
status as de facto independent states. Despite their victory, today these people live in 
limbo, pawns in a greater game characterized by an exploitative Russian state. 
Another former Soviet Socialist Republic, Ukraine, also exists in a state of ethnic 
disharmony. At one pole are the people of Lviv, in the country’s Eurocentric west. This 
city, like Tbilisi, is also lively, immersed in a festival-like atmosphere where 
merrymaking can be heard until the early morning hours. But as one moves further east, 
away from this pole, the Ukrainian language and culture is slowly replaced by Russian. In 
Kyiv, the geographic, political, and cultural center of the country, the Russian language is 
just as common as Ukrainian, and although post-Soviet construction in Kyiv evokes a 
renewed sense of shared ethnonationalistic identity since independence (like Georgia, 
Ukraine also declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1991), various forces 
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continue to divide the country along ethnic and linguistic lines. This Ukrainian-Russian 
cultural and linguistic rupture intensified following the chaos of the Euromaidan, chaos 
that allowed Russia to annex or directly influence large swaths of Ukrainian territory. 
Today, the Republic of Crimea is a de facto member of the Russian Federation, and pro-
Russian separatists still control two of Ukraine’s provincial capitals, Donetsk and 
Luhansk, in the east. Like in Georgia, the Russian Federation’s divisive and exploitative 
methods rapidly eroded Ukraine’s sovereignty in just a few short months. 
Ethnic conflict broils at the heart of both these crises, but the escalation in 
violence seen in Georgia and Ukraine was not solely a domestic phenomenon. It was 
stoked from without. The Russian Federation fans the flames of ethnic division in 
Georgia and Ukraine, inciting Ossetians and Abkhazians to fight against the Georgian 
majority, and driving a wedge between Ukrainian and Russian speakers. This thesis 
explores the nature of Russia’s exploitation, and how in the last twenty-five years 
Russian ethnic policy has affected the modern Georgian and Ukrainian states.  
A. RESEARCH FOCUS: THE EXPLOITATION PREMISE 
Russia has conquered territory by exploiting a country’s inhabitants rather than 
destroying the country’s armies. By focusing on a population-centered strategy rather 
than one based on firepower, Russia has overcome its comparative military and economic 
weaknesses in the international arena and capitalized on regional strengths. Russia is 
actively shaping the internal politics of Georgia and Ukraine, but instead of embarking 
upon a war of steel—a war Russia would most-likely lose through failed occupation or 
through Western opposition—the country has engaged in a war of identity, pitting 
ethnicities against one another. By driving a wedge between ethnic groups in Georgia and 
Ukraine, Russia has achieved real political victory in the post-Soviet space. 
B. A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF RUSSIA’S EXPLOITATION OF ETHNIC 
DIVISION IN GEORGIA AND UKRAINE 
Georgia and Ukraine share a unique historical relationship with Russia, but 
Georgians and Ukrainians have been trying to redefine their futures as Western-aligned 
states, driving Russia to embark upon a consistent Russian strategic approach to ethnic 
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conflict. Though their struggle against Russian interference is similar in many ways, the 
study of the Georgian and Ukrainian cases represent a dichotomy. The Georgians are an 
absolutely distinct people, with a language and writing system unlike any other in the 
world, but they also live side-by-side with other unique ethnic groups with roots in the 
Middle East, Europe, and Eurasia. The Ukrainian experience reveals a different approach. 
Ukrainians share close Slavic ties with their Russian neighbors, but many are today 
fighting to break free of centuries of Russification and build their own unique Ukrainian 
identity. 
Ethnic conflict in Europe is not a problem now relegated to the annals of history; 
it remains an issue central to European security. The Abkhazian, Ossetian, Crimean, and 
Eastern Ukrainian cases are just four examples among many unresolved ethnic conflicts 
simmering within the European region. Highly publicized incidents of ethnic conflict in 
the Balkans are well documented in contemporary academic publications, but studies of 
other European ethnic conflict zones have all but disappeared. Ethnicity is both the blind 
spot and the Achilles heel of the west. The European Union (EU), in particular, posits 
itself as the post-nationalist (and therefore post-ethnic) solution to all of Europe's 
problems. Reality is something very different, of course, but for having declared the 
matter done and dusted, the EU literally lacks the vocabulary to talk sensibly about 
ethnicity or ethnic conflict. As a consequence, it also has no real strategy for it—despite 
the Yugoslav experience, which doesn't lie nearly far enough back in human memory to 
have been so resolutely forgotten. If the West continues to undervalue ethnicity as a 
driving force of foreign policy, then the United States and Europe will continue to be 
caught off-guard by Russia’s exploitation of ethnicity as a pretext to act unilaterally 
within the post-Soviet space. By studying ethnic division in Georgia and Ukraine through 
both a policy and ethnic lens, researchers and policy makers can develop alternate 
strategies—other than arms deliveries or economic sanctions—for countering current 
Russian aggression. The West has much to lose if Russia's ethnic exploitation baiting gets 
out of hand, so a better understanding of its nature can lead to more enlightened strategic 
approaches to Russian brinkmanship. 
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By using an ethnocentric strategy, Russia is able to operate under the radar of 
Western normative response. Even in light of Russian diplomatic, economic, and military 
weakness globally, the country can pursue its foreign policy in innovative (and 
dangerous) ways designed to exploit ethnic divisions and Russia’s cultural and 
institutional knowledge of the post-Soviet space. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), being a military alliance of twenty-eight states that make decisions by 
consensus, is poorly suited for responding to Russian exploitative strategies aimed at 
attacking identity, enhancing the potency of Russia’s coercive foreign policies in Georgia 
and Ukraine. Russia, therefore, has outmaneuvered the West and tempered European and 
American responses to unilateral aggressive actions in the post-Soviet space. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW: CONTEXT OF DIVIDED NATIONS 
Academic studies on the subjects of ethnicity, Russian foreign policy, and 
Georgian/Ukrainian history are plentiful and immensely beneficial to the research of this 
subject, but few draw together the disparate aspects of ethnic division and Russian 
foreign policy. To show a consistent use of specific Russian exploitative tactics, this 
thesis will combine and modify several conclusions of the authors in the fields of history, 
anthropology, and foreign relations. 
1. Georgian and Ukrainian Cases: Historical and Ethnic Background 
For historical and ethnic background, this thesis cites the writings of Caucasus 
specialist Thomas De Waal and Ukrainian historian Andrew Wilson. De Waal’s The 
Caucasus: An Introduction focuses mainly on the roots of modern conflict of the 
Caucasus following the collapse of the Soviet Union, but also ties in the complicated and 
interconnected ethnic roots of the region. The author pays special focus toward the roots 
of conflict, both in 1991–1994 and in 2008, identifying specific and consistent 
destabilizing Russian actions, from supplying arms to separatists to claiming acts of 
genocide. Wilson’s The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation provides a detailed view into the 
development of the modern Ukrainian State, from the legend of Gog and Magog, to 
Kyivan Rus, on through the Soviet Union and present day. Wilson’s work illuminates 
Ukraine and Russia’s shared history and closely linked Slavic identity, both concepts that 
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underlie the root causes of the Ukraine Crisis. This book also illustrates the blended 
nature of Ukrainian ethnic identity (described in great detail in the Ukrainian case study), 
and its weakness under constant Russian influence. Both of these works tell the narrative 
of ethnic struggle, and provide vital context to understanding how past identity conflicts 
have affected the modern Georgian and Ukrainian states. They do not discount the ethnic 
dimension of conflict, but due to the fact that these books are concerned with history, 
they do not adequately address the specific ethnically exploitative character of Russian 
policy in Georgia and Ukraine.  
2. Ethnicity, Ethnic Division, and Ethnic Conflict Theory 
Ethnic conflict today is generally characterized by societal cleavages in 
underdeveloped or destabilized states. In most cases, the origins of ethnic violence are 
easy to define and interpret, and are fueled by domestic struggles among internal groups. 
But what about the fires of ethnic conflict stoked by outside forces? Using ethnic groups 
against each other was a principle means of colonial control practiced by nearly every 
great imperial power, but few all-encompassing and analytical studies of the topic exist 
today.1 Russia has developed a consistent and narrowly effective strategy using ethnicity 
as a means of identity manipulation, taking group differences and fostering internal 
division.  
Understanding the nature of ethnicity, division, and ethnic conflict is vital to the 
analysis of the Georgian and Ukrainian cases. Walker Conner discusses ethnicity 
extensively in chapter four of his book Ethnonationalism, covering the word in current 
usage, and parsing out what separates ethnicity from nationality. This understanding is 
key in achieving the analytical objectives require for this thesis. Ethnicity, when defined 
narrowly, is simply a group of people with a sense of common ancestry.2 Max Weber, in 
his work Economy and Society, identifies an additional aspect of ethnicity: ethnic groups 
possess a shared consciousness and solidarity, especially when confronted by an outside 
                                                 
 1 For example, Great Britain routinely played India’s divided Kingdom’s against each other 
throughout their colonization of the subcontinent. See Lawrence James, Raj: The Making and Unmaking of 
British India (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2000). 
2 Walker Conner, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1994), 100–101. 
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group.3 Building on this observation, Conner reiterates that ethnic groups “must know 
ethnically what they are not before they know what they are.”4 This definition, focused 
on identity in the form of an “us versus them” mentality, is critical to understanding how 
division drives conflict and could provide the opportunity for outside forces to exploit 
division. 
Ethnic conflict theory goes far in clarifying the research direction of this thesis. 
Donald L. Horowitz penned a robust study of ethnic conflict and unified theories in his 
work Ethnic Groups in Conflict. The section “Conflict Theory and Conflict Motives” is 
especially relevant. In the first chapter of this section, Horowitz analyzes existing theories 
of ethnic conflict, and concludes that ethnic conflict has certain distinctive characteristics: 
it links the concerns of elites and the masses; it covers “the role of apprehension and 
group psychology”; and it discusses “the importance of symbolic controversies.”5 In 
subsequent chapters, he discusses group comparisons, group entitlement, secessions, and 
irredentas, all factors that could lead to ethnic conflict and characteristic the Georgian and 
Ukrainian cases. Though Horowitz does not explicitly analyze how ethnicity can be 
exploited in international relations, his theories do show how evident ethnic divides can 
seriously weaken a society and leave it vulnerable to exploitation. This knowledge is 
critical in identifying Russia’s strategic methods, discussed in the hypothesis section to 
follow. 
Horowitz provides a holistic study of ethnic conflict theory, whereas the 
following articles delve into specific aspects of ethnic conflict, which will pertain directly 
to the Georgian and Ukrainian cases. Each provides an additional framework of 
understanding critical to the study of the ethnic aspect of conflicts in each country. 
James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin seek to explain the likelihood of civil 
conflict in their article, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” They find that likely 
causes of conflict are “conditions that favor insurgency,” such as politically weak 
                                                 
3 Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (New York, 1968), 
389, cited in Conner, Ethnonationalism, 102. 
4 Conner, Ethnonationalism, 102. 
5 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2000), 140. 
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governments, low per capita income, and favorable terrain. These conditions allow 
groups with specific ethnic, nationalistic, or religious goals to justify their initiation of 
conflict.6 Several (if not all) of the conditions described by Fearon and Laitin resemble 
the state of affairs in Georgia and Ukraine.7 This article provides a framework, allowing 
the construction of the argument that Russia can ignite ethnic conflict because of the 
country’s ability to identify and exploit state weaknesses. 
In the article “Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign 
Policy Behavior” by David R Davis and Will H. Moore, the authors successfully link 
ethnic groups and international relations, arguing “that transnational ethnic alliances” 
such as the Russian Diaspora “influence foreign policy behavior.”8 This line of argument 
reinforces Russia’s common claim, and constitutional mandate, that it is obligated to 
protect ethnic Russians abroad. Russia has used this reasoning to validate its intervention 
in the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and its support of Crimean and Eastern Ukrainian 
separatist movements. 
Jerry Z. Muller focuses on resolution of ethnic conflicts in his article “Us and 
Them,” concluding that there are only two “least bad” paths toward resolution of ethnic 
conflict: disaggregation or partition.9 Disaggregation was a major feature of the 1992–
1993 Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, where approximately 250,000 ethnic Georgians fled 
their homes in Abkhazia. Four fifths never returned, allowing ethnic Abkhaz, who were 
an 18-percent minority before the conflict, to exert greater political control over the 
region. Alternatively, Crimea’s independence referendum and subsequent annexation 
represented a partition resolution to a conflict, although not one the Ukrainian 
government or its constitution supported. The focus of the Ukrainian conflict did, 
                                                 
6 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” in Essential 
Readings in Comparative Politics, 4th ed, edited by Patrick H. O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski ( New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2013), 86.  
7 Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 90.  
8 David R. Davis and Will H. Moore, “Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and 
Foreign Policy Behavior,” International Studies Quarterly 41, (1997): 181. 
9 Jerry Z. Muller, “Us and Them,” in Foreign Affairs 87, (2008), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/2008-03-02/us-and-them. 
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however, move east to the Donbas after this partition, with little further local conflicts 
occurring in Crimea since Ukrainian military forces pulled out in early 2014.  
Zvi Gitelman’s “Nationality and Ethnicity in the Post-Soviet Republics” offers a 
more specific view into ethnic conditions found in Georgia and Ukraine before, during, 
and after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Gitelman includes data and analysis of the 
1989 Soviet census, including a discussion on language and ethnic groups, and how the 
Soviet leadership vacillated between embracing ethnic differences and attempting to 
squash them.10 The author also studies the civic nature of Ukraine and Georgia; states 
that lacked a coherent ethnic identity, where minorities felt they were being ostracized by 
foreign regimes.11 One such example is over the question of Crimea after Ukrainian 
independence, where three distinct ethnic groups each desired dissimilar futures: Tartars 
an independent state, the Ukrainians to remain with Ukraine, and the Russians a return of 
the peninsula to Russia.12 Gitelman’s analysis, which was published in 1994, correctly 
identified the similar characteristics of both Georgian and Ukrainian identity which made 
Russian exploitation in the region a viable foreign policy strategy. 
These theoretical examples provide context to the historical view taken in this 
thesis, which focused on the specific characteristics of Georgian and Ukrainian identity 
and fit the struggles of those countries into a context centered on Russian strategic 
methods and objectives.  
3. Russian Foreign Policy Goals 
This thesis proposes that Russia’s exploitation of ethnic divides is used to achieve 
the country’s long term foreign policy objectives. The current consensus among experts 
in foreign policy is that Russia has three such strategic objectives: 
1. Create a regional hegemony 
2. Decrease Western influence 
                                                 
10 Zvi Gitelman, “Nationality and Ethnicity in the Post-Soviet Republics” in Developments in 
Russian and Post-Soviet Politics, 3rd edition, edited by Stephen White, Alex Pravda, and Zvi Gitelman, 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994), 243; Gitelman, “Nationality and Ethnicity,” 244–247. 
11 Gitelman, “Nationality and Ethnicity,” 258. 
 12 Gitelman, “Nationality and Ethnicity,” 260. 
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3. Regain “great power” status 
These three strategic objectives are consistently referenced by a variety of 
political scientists and area experts, though they may state each objective differently. 
First, Russia intends to create a regional hegemony, which would likely encompass most 
of the former Soviet territory. This strategic objective, best supported by John J. 
Mearsheimer in both his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics and his article “Why 
the Ukraine Crisis is the West’s Fault,” would increase Russia’s relative level of power 
and security and encapsulates the ultimate realist interpretation of Russian international 
diplomacy.13 Second, Russia seeks to decrease the influence of the West, specifically 
NATO and EU expansion, but also western liberal ideals and pro-democracy 
movements.14 This objective is best supported by Dmitri Trenin in his publication 
Russia’s Breakout from the Post-Cold War System: The Drivers of Putin’s Course. 
Trenin adroitly argues that “the centerpiece of [Russia’s] approach is winning full 
sovereignty for Russia by eliminating foreign political influence in the country and 
ensuring that Moscow’s special interests in its former borderlands are recognized.”15 He 
supports his conclusion through an equal focus on Russia’s historical narrative, policy 
objectives, and Presidential leadership, culminating in Putin’s decision to annex Crimea 
and destabilize eastern Ukraine. Third, Russia wishes to regain “great power” status, thus 
reversing two and half decades of humiliation at the hands of the West. This goal is a 
consistent with the views of Russian specialist Richard Pipes in his article “Craving to Be 
a Great Power”16 and characteristic of a constant theme of numerous speeches given by 
Vladimir Putin.17 Continued belief of Russia’s “great power” destiny has a definite 
domestic, public approval dimension important to the continued existence of the Putin 
                                                 
13 John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault,” Foreign Affairs, 
September/October 2014, 9. 
14 Dmitri Trenin, Russia’s Breakout From the Post-Cold War System: The Drivers of Putin’s 
Course (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2014), 3–4. 
 15 Trenin, Russia’s Breakout, 1. 
 16 Pipes, “Craving Great Power,” 1–2. 
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regime. These three objectives color the decision-making of Russian leaders within the 
Georgian/Ukrainian comparative context explored here, and provide the major analytical 
modality against which Russian exploitative strategic methods are compared. 
Luke Coffey analyzes the characteristics of Russian foreign activity in the 
Caucuses within the context of U.S. and NATO policy. In his 2014 article, “Russia and 
the South Caucasus: A Situation the U.S. Cannot Ignore,” Coffey succinctly reviews both 
“the political instability in Georgia [and] the possible Russian annexation of Georgian 
breakaway territories.”18 Coffey concludes that “Russian influence can be detected 
behind the scenes” and that “Moscow continues to take advantage of ethnic divisions and 
tensions in the South Caucasus to advance pro-Russian policies,” the central argument of 
this thesis.19 Coffey’s observations are consistent with broader historical accounts by De 
Waal, and fill several gaps by looking at the problem from an international relations 
perspective and comparing Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March to the possible future 
annexation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, also a central point of this thesis.  
Russian foreign policy goals in Ukraine—and their ethnic dimension—constitutes 
a major portion of Roy Allison’s argument in his article “Russian ‘Deniable’ Intervention 
in Ukraine: How and Why Russia Broke the Rules.” In this article, Allison discusses 
Russia’s three main objectives: “deny territory of Ukraine to NATO and the EU”; 
decrease Western-leaning tendencies in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 
and secure Crimea.20 These three goals conform to the three strategic objectives 
postulated for this thesis: create a regional hegemony, decrease Western influence, and 
regain great power status. They refer to more specific policy objectives, however; this 
thesis takes a broader opinion of Russia’s goals, though Allison’s insights on Russia’s 
goals forms the basis that led to the development of the three strategic objectives. 
Allison’s study of the ethnic dimension to Russia’s approach to the Ukraine crisis is also 
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of critical importance to this thesis, arguing that there are two major ethnic characteristics 
of Russian foreign policy. First, ethnicity and identity form “central planks of the 
Kremlin’s justificatory rhetoric about its actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine.”21 
Second, appeals to ethnicity and identity articulate “general support for Russian actions 
within Crimea and eastern (as well as hopefully southern) Ukraine among local 
populations” as a means of mobilizing anti-Ukrainian opposition.22 This thesis expands 
upon Allison’s analysis of the Ukraine crisis and applies it to a wider historical 
perspective of Ukraine, as well as the Georgian case. Additional research by Allison is 
central to my goal of linking Russian strategy and exploitation of ethnic division, and 
complements the historical viewpoints expressed by Wilson’s historical perspective.  
D. HYPOTHESES: RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC METHODS 
Based on a careful analysis of the previously mentioned sources, and a detailed 
historical study of both the Georgian and Ukrainian cases, this thesis has identified six 
specific strategic methods Russia uses to exploit ethnicity in its “near abroad,” a phrase 
coined in the early 1990s to refer to the other fourteen former Soviet Socialist Republics. 
Similar tactics repeat in both cases, revealing a cohesive and continual Russian strategy 
aimed specifically at driving a wedge between people of different ethnicities in countries 
outside of Russia. These six strategic methods are: 
(1) Exporting propaganda—The continual use of the Russian language in the 
post-Soviet space gives government-owned Russian media a distinct 
propaganda advantage, allowing the Kremlin to imprint subtle messaging 
upon the Georgian, Ukrainian, and Russian populations.  
(2) Manipulating identity—Through the use of anthropological treaties, 
ethnonationalistic appeals, or free citizenship, Russia finds ways to exploit 
what it means to be Georgian, Ukrainian, or Russian. Weakening identity 
is a key means of attacking fragile bonds connecting different people. 
(3) Arming insurgents—Neither a new nor nuanced approach to exploiting 
conflict, arming your enemy’s enemies with the highest quality and most 
                                                 
21 Allison, “Russian ‘Deniable’ Intervention,” 1282. 
22 Ibid. 
 12 
advanced weapon systems can often be an effective way to influence 
another country’s policy choices. 
(4) Supplying fighters—When arms are not enough, providing the manpower 
to fight becomes necessary. Russia often employs its own disaffected 
population, its Muslim minorities, unemployed veterans, and naïve 
ideologues, as a fighting reserve for separatist forces. 
(5) Exploiting presence—Proximity to the battlefield is a key advantage 
Russia can exploit in Georgian and Ukraine. Russia has enjoyed the 
unparalleled ability and freedom to station crack troops directly within the 
territory of Georgia and Ukraine, giving the country nearly instantaneous 
access to vital strategic assets. 
(6) Freezing conflicts—After the hot war ends, Russia has mastered the tactic 
of “piece keeping,” where the country usurps control of the post-conflict 
phase. Russia burrows itself into the treaty-making process and ensures its 
enemies come of at an extreme disadvantage at the negotiating table. 
In implementing these methods, Russia has demonstrated a specialized strategic 
understanding of the post-Soviet space, and devising increasingly specific strategies that 
are now often grouped under the aegis of “hybrid warfare.” A cursory examination of 
these methods is listed in the following subsections, with a complete examination 
contained within each case study. 
1. Exporting Propaganda 
Modern Russia propagandists benefit from the vast trove of experience acquired 
during the Soviet Union. Today, most Russians and millions of Russophones outside of 
Russia receive a startlingly high amount of propaganda-laden media from various 
Kremlin-owned corporations, concentrated primarily around the television broadcast 
industry. Russian networks, such as RT, Channel One, and Rossiya 1, dominate the 
information space, and corrupt Russian-speaker’s understanding of both domestic and 
international events. 
In Georgia, the use of Russian media is most evident through the continuing 
prevalence of the Russian language in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia. These lightly populated regions lack the wealth or capacity to produce 
substantial media in their native languages, and therefore are dependent on Russian 
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language news sources.23 This leaves local populations vulnerable to manipulation. To 
exercise this control, Russian news outlets have commonly repeated Russia’s reason for 
supporting the breakaway regions as their effort to protect the rights of ethnic minorities 
against genocidal Georgians.24  
Though similarities exist in the Ukrainian case, the country is not clearly divided 
like Georgia’s quasi-stable border with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, nor is the division 
purely ethnic in character. Ukraine does not have a clearly defined delineation of ethnic 
Ukrainians and Russians: the populations are well-mixed, though as one travels further 
south and east in the country they find fewer and fewer Ukrainian speakers. Because of 
the similarity of both languages, and the comparatively larger worldwide Russian-
speaking population, Russian language media outlets decisively outnumber Ukrainian 
language outlets, even within the borders of Ukraine. Thus, the under-serving of 
Ukrainian speakers in their native language makes this population dependent on 
predominantly Russian language media, a vast majority of which is published in Russia, 
laden with propaganda, and then exported to Ukraine. 
2. Manipulating Identity 
Russia has warped the legal definition of citizenship in both Georgia and Ukraine, 
using a manipulative interpretation of Articles 61–63 of Russia’s constitution, which 
define the Russian Federation’s obligation to protect its citizens abroad. Article 61.2 
states: “The Russian Federation shall guarantee to its citizens protection and patronage 
abroad.”25 Though this provision does not specifically entail protection of all ethnic 
Russians, (though the short-lived 1999 Compatriot Act did expressly extend Russian 
citizenship to all Soviet citizens living outside Russia’s borders)26 articles 62 and 63 
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make possible the extension citizenship to Russians living abroad.27 Russia uses this 
interpretation of its constitution as a means of undermining states with large pro-Russian 
populations through the possibility of offering citizenship retroactively as a means to 
justify intervention.  
One particularly nefarious means to exploit Article 62 is Russia’s occasional 
issuance passports to citizens of another country. After those citizens receive a Russian 
passport, they may be recognized as “citizens” of Russia, and the Russian government 
can claim their interference in the territory of another state is a measure to protection 
these citizens.28 The Russian government used this method with great effect in South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, and may have replicated it in Crimea and the Donbas.29 
Russia also manipulates identity through the export of their propaganda and 
“academic” interpretative studies of history, ethnicity, and culture. Dissemination of 
these academic approaches to ethnicity are aimed specifically at Ukraine, and encompass 
the analysis of Russia’s “neighborhood policy,” ethnonationalism, and Novorossiya. 
These manipulative interpretations are designed to undermine Ukrainian identity and 
exploit Russo-Ukrainian ethnic divisions. 
3. Arming Insurgents 
Though not as subtle as exporting propaganda or manipulating identity, Russia’s 
arming of pro-Russian forces in separatist regions remains a favorite, enduring tactic. 
Russia routinely provides weapons to the ethnic minority forces, commonly cutting off 
arms sales to legitimate governments concurrently. This distinguishes the conflicts in 
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Georgia and Ukraine from the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, where Russian arms 
manufacturers equip both sides.30 
Russian military forces supplied South Ossetian separatists with military aid early 
in the Georgian crisis. The officers of local Soviet and Russian military units tended to 
turn a blind eye to raids on their depots by separatists and their sympathizers, feeling 
compassion toward the Ossetians and supporting their desire for greater autonomy.31 
When the focus of the conflict shifted to Abkhazia, Russian support notably increased.32 
Aid ranged from captured or gifted Russian heavy weapons to the permissive use of 
Russian military bases and weapon depots.33 With new Russian weapons and bases of 
supply, Abkhazian militias renewed their attack on the Georgian-occupied regional 
capital of Sukhumi, ultimately driving the government forces from the region.34  
The arms situation in Ukraine snowballed in a similar manner. In April and May 
of 2014, pro-Russian separatist made due with weapons provided by local oligarchs and 
captured from Ukrainian weapons depots.35 After the success of the Ukrainian 
government’s Anti-Terrorism Operation (ATO) in the mid-summer, however, Russia 
began to supply arms and equipment directly.36 Though the exact quantity of military 
equipment the Russian government provided to the pro-Russian separatists in the Donbas 
is difficult to quantify, independent sources captured images of equipment crossing into 
Ukraine at separatist-controlled border checkpoints on several occasions.37 
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4. Supplying Fighters 
Along with arms and equipment, Russia has routinely facilitated the recruitment 
and insertion of “foreign fighters” to conflict zones. This essay defines “foreign fighters” 
as free Russian citizens participating in fighting within Georgia and Ukraine. Although 
piecemeal in the early days of the Georgian crisis, Russia has streamlined and improved 
its system to supply fighters to Ukraine, creating training bases and tapping into several 
sources of manpower among its own motivated citizenry.  
Though not prevalent in great numbers in South Ossetia, a the large influx of 
ethnic Russian and Chechen volunteers flowed into Abkhazia when fighting broke out 
there in 1992. These fighters, motivated by adventure and the desire to aid their 
Abkhazian brothers in their fight against Georgian ultra-nationalists such as President 
Zviad Gamsakhurdia, lent significant weight to Abkhazian forces at a desperate point in 
the battle over Sukhumi.38  
Foreign fighters played a much larger role in the conflict in the Donbas. 
Recruiters in Russia supplied the separatist forces with soldiers through two primary 
sources: military veterans and politicized ideologues.39 These recruits were promised 
high pay and were eager for the opportunity to export their nationalistic ideology.40 As 
the conflict sank into stalemate after the capture of Debaltseve, the supply of these 
fighters grew to a trickle, and they were replaced by Russian regular soldiers pressed into 
“volunteer” service.41 
5. Exploiting Presence 
The presence of well-armed and equipped Russian regular forces based in and 
around Georgia and Ukraine was essential to the accomplishment of Russian aims in both 
the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and the ongoing Ukraine crisis. Easy Russian military 
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access to Georgian and Ukrainian territory is a remnant of Cold War-era Soviet military 
infrastructure; a vast network of bases and depots that were sprinkled throughout the 
post-Soviet space. Russian forces used this infrastructure as a launching point during the 
armed fighting phases of both conflicts. 
Russian peacekeepers have been present in Georgian territory since the early 
1990s, first in former Soviet bases in Georgia proper through ongoing basing deals, then 
in new Russian bases established in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The formation of a 
three-way but Russian lead peacekeeping force following the ceasefires in 1991 and 1993 
was instrumental to this strategy.42 “Peacekeepers” were some of the first Russian units 
to counterattack Georgian forces during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War.43 The situation in 
Ukraine was slightly different, as the Russian forces stationed in Crimea were there based 
on mutual Russian-Ukrainian agreement. In addition to these forces, Ukrainian political 
decision making was also effected by large formations of regular Russian units operating 
close to its borders during the hard summer fighting in 2014. 
6. Freezing Conflicts 
Russia has made prolific use of frozen conflicts as a means to control regional 
politics, evidenced by the unusually high number of such conflicts clustered around 
Russia’s periphery. These undefined and contested regions are characterized by ongoing 
influence of Russian leadership through diplomatic and military support, especially as a 
means to exert leverage and foster instability.  
The ceasefire agreements that ended the South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts, 
and Russian-dominated peacekeeping mission established by the agreements, left 
Georgia’s sovereignty in both regions essentially subordinate to Russia.44 By using their 
role as peacekeepers, Russian military and security forces built strong ties with the 
breakaway regions.45 By 1994, Russia had “succeeded in reasserting its power over 
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Georgia” by using Abkhazia as a means to pry the country apart.46 This was 
accomplished through the unorganized self-interest of local military leaders and parties in 
power back in Moscow. After Georgia’s disastrous attempt to reunify its country in 2008, 
the situation remains unchanged: Russian peacekeepers are still present and the conflict 
remains frozen.  
The creation of a sustained frozen conflict in Ukraine is not yet established, but 
Russia and its proxies are laying the groundwork. The Normandy Five continue to 
negotiate the revision of Ukraine’s constitution, which would give Donetsk and Luhansk 
Oblasts greater autonomy.47 Though this is unacceptable to the Ukrainian government 
and people, the conflict in eastern Ukraine seems to be cooling. The battle lines in the 
Donbas have not changed considerably since the Ukrainian forces’ dramatic retreat from 
Debaltseve in February 2015 and pro-Russian forces have significantly decreased their 
artillery barrages of Ukrainian positions and small-arm attacks on Ukrainian 
checkpoints.48 If the Ukrainian parliament approves an amended constitution, then in all 
likelihood the Donbas will become another frozen conflict, with the separatists denying 
Ukrainian governmental access to their borders with Russia and threatening to rebel 
given the slightest provocation.49 This course is decidedly in Russia’s interest, as it can 
wager its ongoing political, military, and financial support to the Donetsk and Luhansk 
governments to influence the government in Kyiv. If Kyiv affronts Moscow again, like 
what happened during the Euromaidan, then Russia can redouble its support for outright 
separatism in Ukraine’s east as a counter move. 
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E. RESEARCH DESIGN: CASE-BY-CASE, METHOD TO OBJECTIVE 
Conner and Weber’s definition of ethnicity is beneficial in defining the divisive 
nature of ethnicity, and grasps at ethnicity’s defining characteristic of the separation of 
“us” and “them,” but does not provide sufficient theoretical insight to this thesis’s core 
concept: ethnic division. Here, “ethnic division” is defined as the state in which two or 
more ethnic groups exist in the same general area, from the checkerboard nature of 
Ossetian and Georgian villages in South Ossetia to the ambiguous Russo-Ukrainian 
communities of the Donbas. Second, by giving careful consideration to the use of the 
phrases “ethnic division” and “ethnic conflict,” intending to use them to signify different 
concepts. The first phrase embodies a passive state of being, the second an active 
“struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously neutralize, injure, or 
eliminate rivals”50 (rivals being other ethnic groups). Language provides a final wrinkle 
to this thesis’ discussion of ethnicity, especially in the Ukrainian case. The close 
relationship between Russia and Ukraine linguistically, culturally, and ethnically, greatly 
complicates any ethnographic study. Even Ukrainians citizens have trouble expressing 
their own identity.51 This understanding of ethnicity and ethnic conflict is reflected in the 
method of analysis for this thesis. 
This thesis is designed to tie together an ethnic and foreign policy dimensions of 
Russia’s exploitation of division in Georgia and Ukraine, using the three foreign policy 
objectives and the six strategic methods discussed previously as an analytical guide. It 
looks at methods of ethnic exploitation through a historical comparison of both countries, 
focusing specifically on events since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The study of each 
case focuses on strategic choices made by Russian leaders at various critical points in the 
history of Georgia and Ukraine’s post-Soviet history; this format establishes Russia’s use 
of each strategic method as a cogent Russian policy designed to exploit ethnic divisions. 
In researching each case, this thesis combines several academic fields, focusing on 
anthropological research on the origins of ethnic conflict, historical studies of ethnic 
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Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Abkhazians, and Ossetians, and current journalistic and 
international relations periodicals concerning the ongoing conflict in Georgia and 
Ukraine.  
Each case study concludes with a summary of the various ethnic exploitative 
measures used, and an evaluation of the level of foreign policy success that Russia 
achieved. These conclusions rely on the expertise of several preeminent scholars in the 
field of foreign policy and international relations, as well as leading institutions. Polling 
data also provides a unique perspective on the degree of Russian policy success, 
especially in the determination of changes in pro-Western or pro-Russian leanings, or the 
level of patriotism in a given country.  
The final chapter summarizes the similarities and differences of each case, 
focusing on the six strategic methods as the principle analytical tool. It includes an 
assessment of Russian success in exploiting ethnic division to achieve foreign policy 
goals, contain specific policy suggestions, and make predictions for the future of Russia’s 
post-Soviet space. 
F. A NOTE ON PROPER NOUNS AND SPELLINGS 
Choice of spelling is based on the transliterations for the home language. For 
example: the use of Kyiv, the Ukrainian spelling, for Ukraine’s capital, vice Kiev, the 
Russian spelling. The exception to this rule is the use of South Ossetia in place of Shida 
Kartli, its Georgian name. This choice was made for the reader’s ease, as the region is 
most commonly referred to in academia and the media by its South Ossetian place name; 











II. GEORGIAN CASE: NEITHER NUANCED NOR NORMATIVE 
They have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact 
between [the] Western world and their own, feared what would happen if 
Russians learned [the] truth about [the] world without or if foreigners 
learned [the] truth about world within. And they have learned to seek 
security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival 
power, never in compacts and compromises with it. 
—George Kennan, Long Telegram 
Ethnic conflict in the Georgian case is characterized by sharp ethnic differences 
and unique ethnic identities. Nestled in one the world’s throughways, and in a 
mountainous region, Georgians, Abkhazians, and Ossetians are wholly distinctive ethnic 
groups, unrelated to Russian Slavs. Though Russia often evokes its obligation to protect 
Russian minorities as a pretext to intervention in the Caucasus,52 the actual Russian 
population is far smaller than in Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, or the Baltic States. 
Instead, Russia exploits tensions between Georgia’s distinct ethnic groups, supporting 
South Ossetian and Abkhazian separatists politically, economically, and militarily to the 
point where they are completely dependent on Russian benevolence for their ongoing de 
facto statehood. By taking advantage of these ethnic divides, and driving the wedge 
deeper through the use of force and coercion, Russia maintains a strategic advantage over 
Georgia. 
Soviet and Russian exploitation of conflicts between Georgia and South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia has taken on several forms, wafting from direct military intervention to 
“piece keeping” (as opposed to “peace keeping”).53 Russian involvement has been 
characterized specific phases of interference, each defined by various combinations of 
Russian strategic methods. Splitting up Georgia’s recent history into these phases of 
exploitation provide an organizational framework to analyze Russia’s policies piecemeal.  
Soviet imperial collapse at the end of the Cold War marked the beginning of the 
first phase, where Russia, as the heir to the Soviet empire, desperately fought to maintain 
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political influence over as much territory as possible. This phase occurred between 1989 
and 1992, and was indicative of ethnic tensions broiling throughout the Caucasus, from 
Nagorno-Karabakh to Chechnya. Georgia, once a prosperous Soviet Socialist Republic, 
could not escape the chaos. During this first phase, individual Soviet (then Russian) 
leaders acted in disparate and unorganized fashion to undermine the young Georgian 
state, laying the foundation for future conflict. 
The second phase, from 1993–2000, bore witness to the stabilization of the 
conflict in line with Russian objectives. This achievement was embodied by the 
establishment of a Russian-dominated peacekeeping regime. Russian policy during this 
phase was designed to keep South Ossetia and Abkhazia from building closer ties with 
Georgia, resulting in what the international community now commonly refers to as a 
“frozen conflict.” 
The third and most coercive phase of Russian exploitation occurred between 2000 
and the outbreak of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War. This phase was defined by a 
continual, systematic ratcheting up of tensions, prompted by Georgia’s Western-leaning 
policies and Moscow’s coercive responses.  
The fourth and final phase is marked by Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia as independent states, along the Kosovo model, and the slowing of Saakashvili 
era Western progress in the region. The end state of the fourth stage has yet to be 
determined, landmines and detours riddle South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s future path as 
both de facto states continue their search for sovereignty, stability, prosperity, and most 
importantly, international recognition. Today only a handful of countries officially 
recognize the breakaway regions as independent states, but the continued uncertainty of 
sovereign identity of South Ossetia and Abkhazia hangs heavily over the Georgian 
people, as the country struggles to cut the ties to its Soviet past and move forward, united, 
into the future. 
Each of these phases mirrored Russia’s domestic economic and diplomatic 
struggles since the end of the Cold War, through the chaos of Soviet collapse in the 1990s 
to the economic “miracle” of the 2000s. In Georgia, Russia’s attempts to achieve its 
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strategic objectives of hegemonic dominance, anti-Western policies, and a return to great 
power status, masquerade as an eternal peacekeeping mission in an ethnically divided 
state. 
A. BACKGROUND: CROSSROADS OF CIVILIZATION 
In the Caucuses, the conflicts of the post-Soviet era have left ethnic groups 
divided across heavily policed but internationally unrecognized borders. In the Georgian 
case, the primary people of contention are the Ossetians, concentrated in the north-central 
part of Georgia, abutting the Caucasus, and the Abkhazians, clustered along the Black 
Sea coast in the far northwest of the country. Figure 1 is a recent ethnic map of Georgia 
representing these regional distinctions. 
Figure 1.  Ethnic Map of Georgia 
 
The Ossetian population is located in north-central Georgia north of Gori. The Abkhazian 
population is located in the northwest extreme of the country, along the Black Sea coast. 
Large populations of Armenians and Azeri’s are also present in the country’s south-
central region. Source: European Centre for Minority Issues, accessed October 16, 2015, 
http://www.ecmicaucasus.org/menu/info_maps.html 
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The space bound by Georgia’s modern borders has always been a place of diverse people 
and cultures. In addition to the Ossetians and Abkhazians, Greeks, Armenians, and Azeris 
all called the current area of Georgia home. The ethnic Georgian nation-state of modern 
times traces its lineage back thousands of years, to the ancient kingdoms of Colchis and 
Karli-Iberia.54 David the Builder unified the disparate regions of Kakheti, Kartli, Imereti, 
Mingrelia, Meskhia, and Svanti in the eleventh-century, creating the ethnic mashup that 
is conventionally called the Georgian people that exist today.55 Ethnic Georgians of 
every sub-group currently make up 83 percent of Georgia’s 4.9 million population.56  
Ethnic Ossetians are closely related to ethnic Iranians and Scythians from the 
Caucasus region.57 The Ossetians that currently inhabit Georgia first settled north of the 
Caucasus Mountains before moving southward over the range in the eighteenth century, 
establishing villages alongside the local Georgian population in the Shida Kartli region.58 
The Ossetian population living in Georgia, roughly 65,000, is rather small compared to 
the 450,000 Ossetians that live within the Russian Federation in the North Ossetia-Alania 
Republic. Unlike the Circassians of the Black Sea coast, the Ossetians chose to integrate 
themselves into the Russian Empire, fighting for the tsar and later Soviet dictatorship. 
Their heroism during World War Two was well documented: the Ossetians produced 
“more decorated as ‘heroes of the Soviet Union’ per head of population than any other 
Soviet ethnic group.”59 Following the collapse of the USSR, this loyalty naturally caused 
tensions between nationalistic Georgians and the small Ossetian population living among 
them, despite their integration into Georgian society.60 Ultimately, it was Georgian 
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ultranationalists like Zviad Gamsakhurdia, through their xenophobic rhetoric, that drove 
the wedge between the Ossetian and Georgian people.61 
The Abkhazians of Georgia’s Northwestern region were related to several other 
Circassian groups of the Caucasus, such as the Kabardins and the Cherkess, though they 
also shared a close historical bond with the Georgian people. Unlike the Ossetians, the 
Abkhazians resisted Russian rule following the Tsar Alexander I’s 1810 invasion of their 
region. The Abkhazian population fought with fellow Circassian tribes against tsarist 
armies for decades, but when Russian generals finally rooted out and defeated the 
rebellion in 1864, they deported much of the Abkhazians population. This act 
depopulated much of the Black Sea coast, and prompted the immigration other ethnicities 
into historically Abkhazian territory, most notably Svans and Mingrelians, two Georgian 
subgroups.62  
The remaining Abkhazian population suffered greatly at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. The Menshevik government of Georgia (May 1918—February 1921) 
“waged brutal campaigns to incorporate Abkhazia and South Ossetia into their state,”63 
culminating into the killing of thousands of Ossetians by the Menshevik People’s Guard 
in 1920.64 The Red Army conquered the fledgling state by February 1921, putting an end 
to much of the ethnic violence, eventually destroying the last vestiges of Georgian 
resistance with the help of a vengeful Abkhazian population.65 The alliance between the 
Bolsheviks and Abkhazians was short-lived, however; the earlier pattern of forced 
migrations repeated itself in the 1930s under Joseph Stalin’s totalitarian regime, 
ultimately leading to the subordination of Abkhazian culture to the more predominate 
Georgian one.66 By the 1990s, after years of deportations and marginal status, the ethnic 
Abkhaz numbered only 95,000 out of approximately 525,000 residents of their region.  
                                                 
 61 Morris, “Ethnicity and International Relations,” 81. 
 62 De Waal, The Caucasus, 149–150. 
  63 Ibid., 65. 
 64 Ibid. 
 65 De Waal, The Caucasus, 69. 
 66 Ibid., 151. 
 26 
The people of South Ossetia (and to some extent Abkhazia) fared better following 
the death of Joseph Stalin, and were granted significant levels of autonomy within 
Georgia during the later Soviet era, which was characterized by relatively low levels of 
violence. Despite the relative peace of the post-war Soviet era, the Georgians, 
Abkhazians, and Ossetians did not share the same vision of statehood following the 
Georgian declaration of independence in 1991: the Ossetians and Abkhazian people were 
overwhelmingly unified in their desire to remain members of the Soviet Union, having 
grown used to their special autonomous status.67 The realization that Georgian 
nationalists like Zviad Gamsakhurdia may have the power to threaten their very 
existence, may have crystallized South Ossetian and Abkhazian desire to remain 
independent of Tbilisi and strengthen their resolve in the conflict ahead. 
B. PHASE ONE: THE SOUTH OSSETIAN AND ABKHAZIAN WARS 
Hints of Russia’s exploitive ethnic policies began to surface almost immediately 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, first in South Ossetia, then in Abkhazia; 
however, these policies did not initially represent a cogent international strategy. In his 
article, “Georgian-Russian Relations in the 1990s,” Thronike Gordadze describes Russian 
meddling in Georgian affairs not as a coordinated effort, but as a product of the chaos of 
the Soviet collapse: 
It would be unfair to argue that Russia was unilaterally initiating all the 
processes that developed in Georgia and its breakaway territories. At least 
in the beginning of the 1990s, Russia was subjected to internal turmoil, 
which left it reacting to events in Georgia rather than initiating them. Even 
then, Russia was never unresponsive, because it had never, even in the 
worst times, abandoned the idea of maintaining a special influence outside 
its borders.68 
As violence intensified in each conflict, Russia’s various ministry and military leaders 
took the initiative, only to a limited extent in the South Ossetian conflict of 1991–1992 at 
first, but more predominately in Abkhazian conflict of 1992–1993. The individual goals 
of various members of the Soviet, then Russian, government and armed forces 
                                                 
67 De Waal, The Caucasus, 148. 
68 Gordadze, “Georgian-Russian Relations,” 29. 
 27 
characterized Russia’s actions during these two crises, amounting to overt support for the 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russian actions in the first phase fall primarily under three 
of the six Russian strategic methods hypothesized in this thesis: arming insurgents, 
supplying fighters, and ultimately creating frozen conflicts. 
1. Early Conflict: South Ossetia War and the Invasion of Abkhazia 
The ethnic conflict in South Ossetia erupted into violence in 1991 after two years 
of hostility. Armed Georgian bands stalked the Ossetian countryside terrorizing villages, 
ultimately provoking revenge attacks. The simmering conflict came to a boil in January 
1991, when Georgian militias took control of several critical supply routes into 
Tskhinvali, cutting off electricity, water, and food from the South Ossetian capital.69 
Ossetian villagers armed themselves in response, fighting Georgian bands with weapons 
scrounged from abandoned Soviet military bases. The fighters from both sides were 
predominantly amateurs, and even the Georgian militias were under control of the young 
Georgian government only in theory, not in practice.70 Undisciplined and poorly lead 
groups only increased the level of violence. Georgian aggression eventually provoked 
fighters in the North Ossetian SSR to come to the assistance of their southern brethren, 
further destabilizing the region.71 As the fighting continued over the course of eighteen 
months, Ossetian fighters acquired more advanced weaponry and equipment from corrupt 
or sympathetic Soviet and Russian military officials.72 The conflict cooled, however, in 
June 1992, after a Russian-brokered ceasefire. Georgian officials begrudgingly agreed to 
a tri-lateral peacekeeping force composed of Russian, Georgian, and South Ossetian 
troops tasked to establish stability in the region, at least until the opposing sides could 
strike a lasting deal.73  
Russia influenced this conflict more in its inaction rather than its action. Though 
Russia ultimately supplied a majority of Ossetians arms, and allowed the free movement 
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of a considerable number of Russian-born Ossetian fighters, Moscow only marginally 
involved itself in the South Ossetian War. Russia was able to dictate terms at the 
ceasefire negotiations, however, enabling later Russian leaders to exploit the conflict 
achieve broader foreign policy objectives and foreshadowed the looming Abkhazian 
conflict. 
Russia took a more active role in the Abkhazian conflict, which directly followed 
the violence in South Ossetia. Periodic exchanges of fire between Georgian and 
Abkhazian militias characterized a conflict that had been brewing in the region since 
April 1989.74 This period of low level skirmishes persisted until mid-August 1992, when 
a force of 2,000 Georgian fighters under the command of Tengiz Kitovani, the leader of 
the Georgian National Guard, marched on Abkhazia’s provincial capital of Sukhumi, 
reportedly without Georgia’s new leader Eduard Shevenardze’s (the former Soviet 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and native Georgian) knowledge or consent. The city’s 
defenders and provincial government fled north as intense fighting rippled through the 
countryside. Sensing imminent victory, Kitovani gave chase. Georgian forces initially 
pressed their advantage, but experienced a series of military setbacks in mid-September, 
just when they believed Abkhazian resistance was sure to collapse. 75   
2. Support Mustered in Moscow 
This reversal in Georgian fortunes was thanks renewed interest in the region by 
Russian leaders in both the government and armed forces. These decision makers chose 
to provide more direct support to Abkhazia as part of a larger foreign policy shift from 
focus on Central and Western Europe to securing the rapidly dissolving post-Soviet 
space.76 This renewed interest in the Russian “near abroad” provided critical motivation 
toward the deepening of Russian involvement in Georgian domestic affairs. Many 
Russian leaders hoped to achieve personal enrichment or pursue national vendettas at 
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Georgian expense, and former Communist remnants made up the vanguard of this effort. 
These Communist “hard-liners” blamed Gorbachev, and by extension Shevardnadze 
(who served as Gorbachev’s Foreign Minister), for the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the subsequent loss of the elite’s personal power. Through their support of the Abkhazian 
separatists, the “hard-liners” hoped destabilize the young Georgian state and 
subsequently strengthen Russian control in the region.77 Shevardnadze’s former position 
as the Soviet Foreign Minister was now an albatross, garnering the Georgian leader 
credibility in the West but derision in Moscow where support for the fledgling state was 
critically needed.78  
In addition to leaders in the defense and foreign ministries, the Russian parliament 
also supported intervention in Georgian domestic politics. Like in the ministries, some 
parliamentarians did so out of spite, others to further their own political goals: 
Conservative Nationalists…utilized the “external threat” from non-
Russian republics of the former Soviet Union to try and direct the debate 
over Russia’s national interest towards a more confrontational angle. 
Towards the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993 the threat to Russian 
security was perceived to come from the ethnic conflicts in the republics 
of the former Soviet Union, rather than from the old Western Cold War 
enemies. Conservatives accused [Yeltsin] of neglecting Russian relations 
with the republics of the former Soviet Union and demanded that Russia 
reassert power there. Conservative politicians and resurgent armed forces 
increasingly utilized ethnic issues.79 
One of these parliamentarians was Evgenii Ambartsumov, who vociferously advocated 
the creation of a Russian vital sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space.80 Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin initially wished to leave the conflict in Abkhazia up to those with 
a ‘special interest in it,’ but opposition demands eventually elicited a Kremlin response. 
The various North Caucasian nationalists, supporters of the restoration of the USSR, and 
‘red and brown’ patriots wore down Yeltsin, forcing him to take a more hardline stance 
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on the conflicts to maintain at least a modicum of domestic support.81 In Yeltsin’s 
address to the Civic Union in February 1993, he summed up his new stance by stating 
that Russia possessed “special jurisdiction over the peace and stability of the republics of 
the former Soviet Union.”82 Despite rhetoric extorting the importance of Russian 
involvement in the conflicts, the president had little real control over Russian policy in 
Abkhazia: that power rested in the hands of the armed forces. 
3. Arms and Volunteers 
Emboldened by enthusiasm in Moscow, local and central military authorities in 
the Caucasus increased their support of Abkhazian forces in late summer 1992 when 
Abkhazian forces were on the brink of defeat.83 Aid first arrived in the form of 
“captured” or “gifted” Russian heavy weapons as well as the permissive use of Russian 
supply depots and operating bases located within Abkhazia.84 Most damaging to the 
long-term stability of Georgia, Russian military officials allowed the unrestricted flow of 
Russian mercenaries and Chechen Muslim fighters over the Russian-Georgian border. 
These fighters sought to aid the Abkhazians in their struggle against Georgian forces and 
lent significant weight to Abkhazian militias at a desperate point in the battle. Though 
pivotal to Abkhazian victory in the conflict, these mercenaries were also indiscriminately 
violent and undisciplined. They were accused of raping and pillaging both Abkhazian and 
Georgian populations.85 
Abkhazian forces, now bolstered by Russian equipment and volunteer fighters, 
counterattacked in September 1992, forcing the Georgian Army to retreat to the Abkhaz 
capital of Sukhumi and several key geographic chokepoints in the south and east, such as 
the narrow pass at Kodori Gorge. By the fall it became obvious to the Georgians that the 
Abkhazians were receiving prolonged and sustained assistance from Russia.86 Without 
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this assistance, the small contingent of Abkhazian fighters that retreated in the early 
spring would not have been able to throw back the Georgian forces’ advance, especially 
in a region populated by ethnic Georgians unsympathetic to the Abkhazian cause. 
Continued Russian military assistance resulted in the escalation of conflict in 
spring 1993, most ostensibly in the form of Russian close-air support.87 That fall, 
Abkhazian militias, bolstered by Russian weapons, volunteer fighters, and SU-25 
bombers, renewed their attack, focusing their effort on the regional capital of Sukhumi.88 
Georgian forces could not withstand the assault and retreated to the Abkhazian-Georgian 
border and the Kodori Gorge: nearly 250,000 Georgian refugees soon followed.89 
Russian support of Abkhazian separatists was clear and pronounced, with Shevardnadze 
himself claiming that by 1993 the Abkhazian conflict was essentially a war between 
Russia and Georgia.90 Russian political and military support was instrumental to 
Abkhazian success, leading to the collapse of the poorly trained and lead Georgian 
forces. Similar to the Ossetian conflict, the armistice in 1993 lead to the formation of a 
Russian-backed peacekeeping force. Without control of the vast majority of Abkhazian 
territory, the Georgian government could not rightly declare legitimacy in the region, at 
least not from the Russian perspective.  
4. The War’s Aftermath 
By the armistice of 1993, Georgia was on the verge of complete political and 
economic collapse.91 Hard-liners in the Russian foreign and defense ministries took 
advantage of Georgian weakness, and mustered all their remaining diplomatic powers to 
punish the young state; they were determined “to defend [Russia’s] ‘national interests’ in 
the former Soviet South” using any means necessary, including armed Russian troops.92 
Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, a key player during the final ceasefire 
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negotiations, overtly sought to use the conflict as a means to “insert a Russian military 
presence in both Abkhazia and Georgia.”93 The ceasefire agreement resembled the 
framework established following the South Ossetian War: Georgian, Abkhazian, and 
Russian forces would create a three-way peacekeeping mission, though with several 
caveats that severely undermined Georgia’s sovereignty. These additional measures 
included mandatory Russian access to Georgia proper to “assist” in destroying the last 
vestiges of Zviadist rebels in Mingrelia, a renewal of Russian basing agreements, and 
Russia’s right to name Georgia’s Defense Minister.94 Grachev’s intent to punish Georgia 
was pervasive, and set the tone for Russian-Georgian relations for the rest of the decade. 
By 1994, Russia had “succeeded in reasserting its power over Georgia” by using a 
separatist region as a means to pry the country apart.95 This division was accomplished 
primarily through Russian military assistance (provided by local military leaders in 
piecemeal and unorganized fashion) and pressure Moscow ministers and parliamentarians 
exerted on President Yeltsin in Moscow. Though effective in destabilizing Georgia, these 
Russian stakeholders “did not act in unison nor were each department’s activities always 
consistent or compatible…Russia did not have a coherent foreign policy nor concrete 
proposals for forming one.”96 Nevertheless, the signing of the Ossetian and Abkhazian 
ceasefires ushered in a new phase of Russian exploitation of the ethnic conflict, one that 
codified many of the disparate interests of the Russian government and demonstrated the 
first examples of Russian strategic methods. Arming insurgents and supplying fighters 
resembled classic Cold War methods of destabilization through the export of violence, 
but the follow-through, establishing frozen conflicts, was a new invention. By stoking 
violence and enforcing destabilizing peace agreements, Russia laid the groundwork for 
future conflicts, and further exploitation of ethnic divisions. 
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C. PHASE TWO: PEACEKEEPING IN A FROZEN CONFLICT 
The presence of Russian peacekeeping forces and slow “freezing” of both 
conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia is a chief characteristic of the second period of 
Russian exploitation of ethnic divides in Georgia. By using this method, Russian 
diplomats and politicians sought normative appeal to Western practices of peacekeeping, 
while simultaneously fulfilling Russian strategic objectives. The ceasefires that froze the 
South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts, and Russian-dominated peacekeeping mission 
established after the cessations of violence, violated Georgia’s sovereignty and left the 
country essentially subordinate to Russian influence.97 For example: Russia used the 
ceasefire negotiations in 1993–1994 as a platform to extent its basing rights in Georgia 
proper, and later as leverage to force Georgia into joining the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS). These and other measures allowed Russia to maintain its 
hegemonic dominance in the region, at least for the 1990s and early 2000s.98 Through its 
role as peacekeepers, Russian military and security forces built strong ties with the 
breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.99 The ongoing presence of 
peacekeepers is pivotal to the sustainment of Russian power in the region.  
Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev played a critical role in the 
establishment of persistent Russian presence in Georgia. Minister Kozyrev argued that 
forces from his country were simply “filling a vacuum…which otherwise quite different 
forces might rush to fill,” to justify the necessity of Russian troops in Georgia.100 The 
Russian Foreign Ministry countered Georgian claims of bias by extolling the 
international nature of CIS peacekeeping forces, though other members of the 
commonwealth provided only token support. In an address to the United Nations (UN), 
Minister Kozyrev further justified Russian control of peacekeeping forces, claiming that 
Russia “has made peacemaking and the protection of human rights, particularly that of 
national minorities, the priority of its foreign policy, first of all in the territory of the 
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former USSR.”101 Muted Western response to these pronouncements spoke volumes, 
reinforcing Russia’s sense of invincibility and cementing the appearance that other 
country was willing to confront Russia to protect Georgia’s sovereignty. 
This abdication of Georgian and Western responsibility for peacekeeping 
operations was a result of several Security Council resolutions mandating Russian—
through the CIS—dominance of forces in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.102 Western 
members of the Security Council agreed to the resolution recognizing “that it is 
unavoidable that Russia will pursue its own interests in dealing with local or regional 
conflicts on its peripheries” even though they acknowledged that “Russian leaders may 
be tempted by revanchism or a softer form of neo-imperialism and that peacekeeping 
may become an instrument of coercion in the conduct of such a policy.”103 Yet, the 
Western powers did nothing. International weakness on the part of the UN, NATO, EU, 
and United States, all provided cover for Russia to exploit its peacekeeping mission in 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia to further Russian strategic goals at Georgian expense. 
Oversight of the peacekeeping mission and reconciliation councils was deeply 
flawed, favoring Russia and the secessionist members of the councils over Georgian 
interests. In South Ossetia, this manifested itself in the day-today administration of the 
Joint Control Commission, set up as a forum for negotiation. In this council, Georgia 
received only one of the four voting seats, the others being Russia, North Ossetia, and 
South Ossetia, all three clearly aligned against Georgia. Russia further controlled the 
process by enforcing bylaws that required every member to be present to vote for new 
resolutions.104 This requirement gave Russia the ability to slow any progress toward 
reconciliation by merely neglecting to attend, in the unlikely event that the other three 
parties actually agreed on any particular measure. Such a dynamic made it more difficult 
for Georgia to unilaterally and autonomously forward motions pertaining to domestic 
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policies without first obtaining the support of all the other parties, an unlikely outcome 
none-the-less. 
The maintenance of this status quo waned in the late 1990s, due in part to Russian 
weaknesses economically and diplomatically coupled with a decline in the strategic 
advantages South Ossetia and Abkhazia provided. Several conflicts of the mid and late 
1990s, specifically the first Chechen War, and the collapse of the ruble in 1998, gave the 
appearance that Russia was weakening.105 At the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit, Russia 
found itself under heavy pressure to withdraw its forces in Georgia. Russian neo-
imperialists and former Communists began to lose power in the government. Increased 
support for Georgia from the United States, especially during the first few years of the 
Bush administration, also played a key role in the decline in Russian “ability to act in and 
for Abkhazia.”106 It took the “election” of a new Russian leader with vision and drive to 
reverse the tide of Russian foreign policy retreat. 
Despite the precipitous decline in Russian power throughout the 1990s, its 
peacekeeping forces and strategic objectives in Georgia remained essentially unchanged, 
with Russian policy focused on maintaining the status quo. The rise of Vladimir Putin, 
first as the Russian Prime Minister and then as the President, however, jumpstarted a new 
approach to Russian-Georgian relations. Putin and his cabinet favored an increase in anti-
Georgian policies and rhetoric, while simultaneously pursuing further exploitation of the 
frozen conflicts. This anti-Georgian policy shift intensified after the 2003 Rose 
Revolution: Putin and his regime responded to the rise of Mikheil Saakashvili by 
stepping up punitive measures designed to both injure the Georgian state, and increase 
Russian domestic standing. 
Exploiting presence through peacekeeping and freezing conflicts were the major 
Russian strategic methods used during this phase of Russian exploitation. Russian actions 
created an unbalanced and unstable status quo, leaving all participants in a state of 
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sovereignty limbo. Similar to the first phases, this phase was based on Russian inaction as 
much as Russian action. Russia did not recognize South Ossetia or Abkhazia’s 
declarations of independence, nor did it acknowledge Georgian complaints about 
violation of its sovereignty. 
D. PHASE THREE: COERCIVE WARMONGERING 
The rise of Putin and Georgia’s desire to build closer ties with the West 
characterized the third phase. The desire to break out of the post-Cold War system and 
reestablish a hegemonic empire within Russia’s former area of influence dominated the 
Putin Administration’s strategic thinking. Putin perceived NATO and EU expansion as 
threat to Russian power, and sought to politicize any further expansion of either 
organization as evidence of continued Western anti-Russian aggression.107 Russian 
diplomatic and military influence remained limited, however, only occasionally 
manifesting itself in covert uses of force. The country could not embark on military 
campaigns without upsetting the global strategic balance, dominated by the United 
States’ war on terror, characterized by military deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Instead, the Putin regime carefully weighed its strategic options and molded them into 
specific political objectives designed to exploit the frozen conflicts in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia. Thus, Russian policy during this period demonstrated patience and willingness 
to take advantage of political and diplomatic opportunities through the strategic methods 
of exporting propaganda and manipulating identity.  
Revitalizing Russia’s Great Power status became the leading motivator of Russian 
policy objectives in Georgia. Putin addressed this goal directly in his May 2004 address 
to the Russian Parliament. In this speech, Putin sought the deepening CIS integration as a 
means to revitalize Russia’s standing in the world and offset advances by NATO and 
EU.108 The details about how Russia would go about re-establishing itself as a great 
power remained vague, however, as George Tarkhan-Mouravi reflected in his analysis of 
Russian foreign policy in the region: 
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[Russia has] no well-defined long-term general strategy other than the 
revival of Russian grandeur, actual policies are highly volatile. Instead of 
a coherent overall strategy in the Caucasus, Russia tends to pursue short- 
and medium-term tactical goals that focus on regime succession, security, 
and domination….[T]he thrust of policy is clear: to preserve at all costs 
Russia’s domination of the region, in the vague hope of reviving the 
empire at some point in the future.109 
Russia would continue to exploit ethnic tensions to maintain influence in Georgia, 
especially as the country sought closer ties with the West, coercing the country when it 
deemed necessary.110 During this phase Russia’s policy implementations were based 
largely on pretexts. Russia would respond to Georgian actions, each one ratchetting up 
already tense relations. Georgia’s NATO and EU accession aspirations provided a perfect 
pretext for further exploitation of both conflicts. 
1. The Alignment Pretext 
The first such pretext was Georgia’s desire to pursue a Western alignment with 
the EU and United States. Georgia joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program in 
1994, and sought active participation with the alliance in 1999 to assist in peacekeeping 
operations in Kosovo.111 Also, in 1999, Georgia and the EU signed the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement, strengthening political and economic ties to Europe in addition 
to close military cooperation.112 In 2002, Georgia voiced interest in joining NATO for 
the first time, and sought US military aid through the Georgia Train and Equip 
Program.113 This first step was important for the professionalization of Georgian defense 
forces, allowing Georgia to stabilize the Pankisi Gorge and other regions that were under 
periodic attack by separatist bands. The EU and Georgia intensified relations in 2003 
after the Rose Revolution and election of President Mikheil Saakashvili, in a dialogue 
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that promised “ambitious programmes of political and economic reform.”114 Saakashvili 
initially wished to pursue an accelerated EU integration policy “together with Russia,”115 
but a series of abusive Russian policies inevitably drove Georgia to seek an independent 
path.116 In part, as a response to Russian policies, NATO and Georgia began an 
Intensified Dialogue in 2006, further strengthening military ties.117 Western aspirations 
were a key component of Saakashvili’s leadership platform, and though it assisted in the 
spread of Western goodwill and support of the small Caucasian country, these actions 
would motivate Russian leaders to act against Georgia. 
Georgia’s Western aspirations angered and dismayed Russian leaders, who saw 
NATO and EU expansion, especially into Russia’s area of interest, as a direct threat to 
Russia’s goals of hegemonic dominance and the creation of a pro-Russian economic and 
political structure. Under the backdrop of stronger Western ties, Georgia soon was 
exposed to the full weight of Russia’s exploitative strategy: through military alliances and 
aid (arming insurgents), coercive diplomacy (exporting propaganda and manipulating 
identity), and war (exploiting presence). 
2. Military Alliances and Aid 
First, Moscow encouraged military and diplomatic unions among the separatist 
states, finalizing the first major agreement in September 2002. This 2002 agreement 
cemented an alliance between South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the event of Georgian 
aggression, also acknowledging the need for continued Russian leadership and military 
support.118 Additional agreements between South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Moldova’s 
breakaway region of Transnistria were signed in 2006. These agreements were entitled 
“the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Support and Declaration on the 
Creation of a Commonwealth for Democracy and the Rights of Nations” and further 
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solidified concepts of military cooperation and promises of support “in case of 
emergency.” As a final dismissal of Georgian sovereignty, both agreements included a 
statement acknowledging the region’s loyalty to Moscow.119 Russia acted as both the 
arbiter and mentor during these negotiations, seeking to isolate Georgia and strengthen 
the bonds between the breakaway regions and their combined pursuit of autonomy or 
eventual independence. 
Russia rewarded South Ossetian subservience with direct military aid, primarily 
in the form of heavy equipment, basing deals, and financial assistance. Between February 
2003 and June 2004, the Russian government supplied South Ossetia with twelve T-55 
and seventy-five T-72 battle tanks.120 The Russian military also expanded its “military 
and administrative control” over the region:  
These [measures] included the construction of military bases near Java 
(Iziugomi) and in Tskhinvali, opening a special department at the military 
academy in Vladikavkaz for cadets from South Ossetia, and sending 
several dozen Russian military instructors to the territory. Moreover, it 
included transferring Russian officers to South Ossetia for routine military 
service, as well as the appointment of Russians to head South Ossetia’s 
ministries of defense, security, and law enforcement.121 
In addition to tanks, on June 2–6, 2004, Russia supplied South Ossetia with “Grad” 
multiple-launch rocket systems, self-propelled artillery systems, and anti-aircraft 
weapons.122 By 2008, Russian supply of weapons to Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
exceeded Georgian military materials; the two regions essentially “had received at no 
cost more than twice the military equipment possessed by Georgia.”123 Though not a 
particularly nuanced strategy, the concentration of Russian arms in both regions assured 
their survival in the event of a Georgian attack, limiting the options available to 
Saakashvili in his pursuit of South Ossetian and Abkhazian reconciliation, and 
establishing a clear example for Russia’s strategic method of arming insurgents. 
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While increasing South Ossetian and Abkhazian military reliance on Russia, 
Putin’s administration also sought to bind the regions to Russia economically. Enforcing 
compliance was easy, however, due to the continued deplorable state of development in 
both regions. Abkhazia was especially hard-hit by the conflicts of the early 1990s. A 
region once populated by 525,000 inhabitants had been reduced to 240,000, a slight 
majority ethnic Abkhazians, who are desperately impoverished and widely unemployed. 
Abkhazia was “too weak on its own to maintain its de facto independence without 
Russian assistance.”124 Russia propped up both regions through generous subsidies and 
the payment of pensions. To this day, both South Ossetia and Abkhazia are wholly 
dependent on Russian financial support.125 By accepting Russian assistance the 
breakaway regions have surrendered their independence, their very future, to Russian 
benevolence, without much thought given to their position in a larger foreign policy 
strategy. 
3. Coercive Diplomacy 
Russia also sought to muddy the waters of citizenship within the region. This 
campaign began in 2000 when the Russian Parliament passed a law exempting South 
Ossetian and Abkhazian residents from Russian visa requirements.126 In June 2002, 
Russia expanded this policy to the direct issuance of passports to residents of both 
regions, a program Moscow accelerated in May 2004.127 By July 7, 2006, 98 percent of 
South Ossetians had essentially been granted Russian citizenship through the issuance of 
Russian passports. This passport policy was especially worrying to Georgian officials, 
not only because it contributed greatly to smuggling of Georgian goods into Russia tariff 
free, but also because it creates “a pretext for the future ‘protection’ of [Russia’s] new 
citizens.”128 This measure, which Russia often blends with it self-proclaimed obligation 
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to protect the ethnic Russian diaspora, was a pretext for Russian involvement in the 
conflicts of the early 1990s and 2008. 
Russia’s exploitative measures were not limited to the punishment of Georgia, but 
were focused on the breakaway regions themselves, especially when they began to drift 
away from Moscow’s orbit. This manifested itself first in South Ossetia during the 2001 
presidential elections. Russia sponsored the creation of the “Meeting of Four” consisting 
of “the most radical South Ossetian leaders.”129 These men met to work out a way to 
prevent Ludvig Chivirov from winning re-election. Chivirov was the incumbent 
president, and was avidly pursuing a settlement with Shevardnadze that would normalize 
relations and put an end to the conflict. With Russian political and financial support, a 
member of the “Meeting of Four,” Eduard Kokoity, managed to win the election, and 
proceeded to chase out, arrest, or “disappear” all major challengers to his regime, setting 
the region on a course of further separation with Georgia and into Russia’s cold 
embrace.130 Russian meddling also permeated the political process in Abkhazia, a telling 
example of Russian interference occurred in October 2004:  
The first-ever contested presidential election in Abkhazia… was marred 
by the Kremlin’s open support for one of the candidates, Raul 
Khadzhimba, a security service man fully loyal to Moscow. When Abkhaz 
voters rejected Khadzhimba in favour of the more popular opposition 
leader Sergei Bagapsh, Abkhazia was hit by two months of political crisis, 
which verged on the brink of mass violence. As Bagapsh announced his 
forthcoming inauguration, Moscow exerted enormous direct pressure, 
sending officials to Sukhumi and even blackmailing the population by 
closing the border. This unprecedented bullying led to a bizarre 
compromise: new elections in January 2005 were won by an alliance of 
recent rivals—“President” Bagapsh and “Vice-President” Khadzhimba.131 
This level of political manipulation reflects Russia view of its role in the region: 
secessionist leaders are simply tools used to divide and weaken Georgia. Russia does not 
act solely as the legitimate protector of South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s independence, 
but seeks to manipulate all sides of the conflict for Russian gain. 
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4. 2008 Russo-Georgian War 
By the fourth year of his presidency, Saakashvili was utterly frustrated with 
Russia’s desire to pursue stronger South Ossetian and Abkhazian military, political, and 
economic ties. Instead of promoting peace, “Moscow strives to keep conflicts unresolved, 
while posting ‘peace-keepers’ who are actually peace-blockers.”132 Saakashvili’s attitude 
toward the two regions turned hawkish, a feeling perhaps engendered by an increasing 
belief in his cabinet that the United States and Europe would provide the military and 
diplomatic cover needed to prevent Russian involvement.133 Following a Russian 
provocation of dubious origin, Georgian troops shelled Tskhinvali on the night of August 
7, 2008. The next day, Georgian troops launched their invasion, occupying several 
Ossetian villages with the stated goal of forcefully reuniting the breakaway region with 
the Georgian state. But the Georgians overplayed their hand. Already conducting training 
operations north of the Russo-Georgian border, Russian combat forces quickly mobilized, 
and launched a rapid counteroffensive through the Roki Tunnel, linking up with Russian 
peacekeepers already present in the region. Russia initiated a second offensive through 
Abkhazia and, with overwhelming air support, was able to push Georgian forces out of 
the Upper Kodori Gorge, an area within Abkhazia that the Georgian military had 
occupied since the 1990s.134 The Russian military completely routed the Georgian army 
after just five days of fighting, and advanced into Georgian territory, occupying 
roadways, railways, and ports throughout central and western Georgia.135 
The Russian propaganda machine kicked into high gear almost immediately. 
Among several other legalistic arguments, Russia claimed that it was forced to respond to 
the Georgian attack in order to defend Russian and Ossetian citizens in danger of 
becoming victims of genocide. Russian media outlets were quick to report the Georgian 
shelling of Tskhinvali had resulted in more than two thousand dead.136 South Ossetian 
leaders used this claim “to help justify their actions in driving the Georgian civilian 
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population out of South Ossetia [resulting in the] destruction of Georgian villages and the 
forced displacement of thousands of ethnic Georgians by South Ossetian militia.”137 This 
example shows the power of Russian propaganda in driving the belligerents in a conflict 
into actions which ultimately increase the effectiveness of Russia’s position. In this case 
the displacement of ethnic Georgians from South Ossetian territory, further 
homogenizing the breakaway region and limiting Georgian power during post-conflict 
negotiations. 
This phase of Russian ethnic exploitation was characterized by those methods 
used in the first two phases (arming insurgents, supplying fighters, exploiting presence, 
and freezing conflicts) with exporting propaganda and manipulating identity added. This 
phase then holistically captured the full force of Russian exploitation of ethnicity, and a 
crystallization of a cohesive Russian strategy aimed at accomplishing Russian strategic 
objectives. 
E. PHASE FOUR: WITH RUSSIA OR ALONE? 
The status quo established following the 2008 War has changed little since the 
short but brutal war and Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as 
independent states.138 Exploiting presence and freezing conflicts is the main theme of 
this phase, as Russia expands its dominance South Ossetian and Abkhazian politics, 
economics, and military,139 possibly moving toward outright annexation of the two 
regions in the near future.140 
Russia continues to strengthen its presence in the region. Today, more than 5,000 
Russian personnel are stationed in Abkhazia, with $465 million earmarked in the past 
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four years for “rehabilitation and construction of military infrastructure.”141 Russia has 
also stationed ten security patrol boats in Ochamchire and four fighter aircraft in 
Bombora. Base construction is ongoing, as Russian engineers have also recently 
completed numerous additional military housing facilities within the region. Abkhazian 
forces no longer control their own borders: Russian troops have even taken over control 
of the Abkhazia’s single link to Georgia, the bridge over the Inguri River. This crossing 
had been manned by Abkhazian militia, but in September 2012, Russian border guards 
replaced the Abkhazian soldiers.142  
Other than military support, Abkhazia’s government receives annual financial aid 
packages from Russia, money that Sukhuymi has grown dependent on. In 2012, 
approximately a fifth of the Abkhazian government’s operating expenses were provided 
for by Russia, accounting for $61–$67 million a year, in addition to Russia’s $350 
million, three-year infrastructure project designed to rebuild “roads, schools, government 
buildings and agriculture.”143 Yearly negotiations between Russia’s foreign ministry and 
Abkhazia’s parliament often dependent upon the successful dispersal of Russian funding. 
Russia also seems poised to officially annex both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On 
November 24, 2014, a Russian-Abkhazian dialogue concluded with the “Russian-
Abkhazian Agreement On Alliance and Strategic Partnerships,” and included clauses 
concerning the reconstruction of the Transcaucasus railway, further increases in Russian 
security presence, and creation of a Russian-Abkhazian “joint group of forces.”144 Putin 
signed a similar agreement with South Ossetia on March 18, 2014, ostensibly on “the first 
anniversary of the Russian annexation of Crimea.”145 This agreement, entitled the 
“Treaty of Alliance and Integration,” went “well beyond the matters of military 
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integration and include the Russian takeover of South Ossetia’s border control, finances, 
economy, education, healthcare, and social welfare systems.”146 Obviously international 
recognition of South Ossetia’s annexation, if the annexation is finalized, will be slow, but 
whereas coverage of the Crimean Anschluss was widespread, Russia’s agreement with 
South Ossetia, after nearly a quarter century of conflict, quietly took place with little 
international media attention.  
Despite these moves toward dependence and annexation, everything is not sunny 
in Russo-Abkhazian relations: 
Some clear areas of discord exist between the Abkhaz and Russians as 
well. Russia would like more opportunities for its citizens to buy property 
and invest in the development of tourist infrastructure but has faced legal 
obstacles and public discontent. Relations between the Orthodox Church 
in Moscow and Sukhumi, the capital of Abkhazia, are strained. Disputes 
over territory and a new road to the North Caucasus demonstrate the 
Abkhaz leadership’s unwillingness to hand over all authority.147 
Recent protests in June of 2015 in Abkhazia show the country is continuing to experience 
domestic schisms.148 The root of the June demonstrations was a result of Russia’s 
reneging on an expected $90-million financial aid package, which Russia justified based 
on Abkhazia’s parliamentary foot dragging concerning some tenants of the previously 
mentioned “Agreement on Alliance and Strategic Partnership.”149 The region’s manic 
desire to retain actual independence while simultaneously reliant on continued Russian 
support explains Abkhazian delaying tactics.150  
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F. CONCLUSION 
Though Russian policy had not been consistent in its applications, it has remained 
consistent in its overall goals: to establish a regional hegemony, decrease Western 
influence, and increase Russia’s great power status. Every method that Russia has 
undertaken in Georgia in the last twenty-five years has been implemented with those 
three goals in mind. There is no evidence that Russia will give up achieving these goals 
anytime soon. 
Arming insurgents and supplying fighters along its frontiers is the most 
aggressive course Russia has taken in Georgia in the last quarter century. Russia has 
perfected these strategic methods during its nearly constant involvement in the Georgian 
crisis, though its use is neither nuanced nor particularly innovative. Russia enjoys an 
enormous military advantage along all its western borders, and possesses enough military 
hardware to provide South Ossetian and Abkhazian separatists with marginal military 
advantage over their Georgian rivals indefinitely. Georgian defeat in the disastrous 2008 
war cemented the realization that the country could no longer hope to unify its territory 
by force. Russian military interventionist policy, in the context of arming insurgents and 
supplying fighters has proven to be overwhelmingly effective.  
Exploiting presence and freezing conflicts, through the use of peacekeeping 
forces, has been Russia’s second major avenue of coercive foreign policy in Georgia. The 
presence of ground forces in disputed territories, especially if those forces are better 
trained and equipped than the locals, gives Russia greater regional control. The longer 
these forces are in place, the more the local inhabitants become accustomed to the status 
quo. This normalizes the conflict psychologically. Russia can also call upon these forces 
on short notice to intervene in defense of Russia’s own self-interests, not necessarily in 
the interest of maintain unbiased peace. In the end, presence matters. 
In Phase Three, coercive policies of propaganda and identity manipulation typify 
Russia’s patient, long-term approach to maintaining their power over Georgia. In the 
2000s, Russia implemented a series of policy changes that slowly ratcheted up tensions 
between Russia and Georgia while simultaneously building stronger ties with South 
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Ossetians and Abkhazians. Economic subsidies, military training, and travel privileges 
were all carrots Russia provided to the populations of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as a 
means of securing their loyalty. The added supply of Russian passports, along with 
coercive in divisive manipulative policies further destabilized the region. Russian support 
of local political campaigns further ensured Moscow’s choice of South Ossetian and 
Abkhazian national leaders took precedence over possible future conflict resolution. 
The outcome of the Fourth Phase remains to be seen, but it will probably reflect 
the path taken over the last twenty-five years: a disorderly and inconsistent Russian 
foreign policy vis-à-vis Georgia, but one that still relies on taking advantage of an 
existing ethnic divisions. For now crisis seems distant, especially if Georgia’s post-
Saakashvili government continues to drag its heels on issues of reform and European 
integration.151 Russia’s actions in the 2008 War were largely in reaction to Georgian 
attempts to align closer to the West and forcefully re-assume its sovereignty, so if 
Georgian progress towards further Western ties slows, then so should exploitative 
Russian actions.  
Russian goals of hegemonic dominance, countering pro-Western sentiments, and 
a return of Russia to great power status were largely achieved in the Caucasus, especially 
during the period of 1994–2000, but achievement has become harder to quantify since 
Putin’s rise to power. Georgia may have to accept the permanent loss of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia, but the remaining Georgian territory is far more cohesive then it was in 
1989, politically and ethnically. Perhaps in the end the country can find strength in its 
struggles against Russia, and pursue its own path toward whichever future the Georgian 
people feel will suit them best. 
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III. UKRAINIAN CASE: NATO MADE ME DO IT 
All persons with grievances, whether economic or racial, will be urged to 
spelt redress not in mediation and compromise, but in defiant violent 
struggle for destruction of other elements of society. Here poor will be set 
against rich, black against white, young against old, newcomers against 
established residents, etc. 
—George Kennan, Long Telegram 
 
Ukraine’s case is categorically different than the Georgian one for two primary 
reasons. First, in contrast with the Georgian case, Ukraine is a state with a weak 
nationalistic identity with ambiguous lines of ethnic division, though one that has been 
strengthened following subsequent Orange Revolution and Euromaidan. Second, 
Ukrainians share substantial ethnic and nationalistic ties with Russia, along Slavic, 
historical, and linguistic lines, unlike the Georgian case. Both these conditions make 
Ukrainians vulnerable to ethnic exploitation practiced by Russia, especially in areas with 
large ethnic Russian populations, such as Crimea and the Donbas, and in areas with 
Russian-speaking majorities, as in most of the east and south of the country. This 
interwoven cultural relationship, and the theories which attempt to explain the 
consequences of that history, are discussed in the first subsection 
The remaining subsections analyze Russia’s exploitative methods from a resent 
historical perspective, demonstrating Russia definitive short-term political and military 
victory in Ukraine. Like in the Georgian case, several distinct phases of operation 
characterize Russia’s exploitative strategy in Ukraine. Phase one encompasses the era of 
Viktor Yanukovych, beginning with his first successful presidential bid in 2010 and 
ending in 2014 when he and the Party of Regions left power. Phase Two begins 
immediately after Yanukovych’s late-night flight, and deals exclusively with Russia’s 
intervention in Crimea, culminating in the annexation of the peninsula March 18th, 2014. 
The Third Phase encompasses the uprising in the Donbas and ends following the signing 
of the Minsk II agreement. Events since Minsk II will be discussed this chapter’s 
conclusion.  
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A. BACKGROUND: A NEW NATION 
As previously stated, a long historical perspective is the key to understanding the 
complicated ethnic, cultural, and linguistic relationships that exist within Ukraine today. 
Russia and Ukraine’s conjoined history essentially begins with the founding of Kyivan 
Rus, an early medieval kingdom with a primarily Slavic population that reached its height 
in the eleventh century. Kyivan Rus flourished for two centuries under the rule of 
provincial princes until the Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century effectively 
dismantled the kingdom, setting Kyiv and Muscovy on divergent developmental paths. 
By the time the Mongolian Horde’s power had withered in the fifteenth century, Kyiv 
and what today is western Ukraine was integrated into the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth, While Muscovy, and later the Russian Empire, slowly expanded 
throughout the Eurasian steppes.152 Most of eastern Ukraine was finally absorbed into the 
Russian Empire in the eighteenth century, partially closing a long period of divergent 
development. 
Colonial rule and policies of Russification characterized Tsarist Russia’s 
administration of Ukrainian territory. Martin Malia states the importance of 
understanding Russia’s imperial past may provide the key to explaining its modern 
behavior: “one of the basic reasons for the tenacity with which Russians have managed to 
hold on to conquered territories lies in the fact that their political absorption was and to 
this day continues to be accompanied by colonization.”153 The Ukrainian people were a 
target of this colonization policy, their concept of a unique Ukrainian identity often 
undermined by large influxes of ethnic Russian populations into Ukrainian lands and 
Tsarist edicts delegitimizing the spoken or written Ukrainian language.154 After a brief 
period of independence following the collapse of Romanov Dynasty, Soviet Socialism 
brought with it new and often manic approaches to explaining Ukrainian identity, 
beginning with mostly open support for minority nationalities in the Soviet space, but 
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tilting back toward suppression and repression as Stalin’s regime amassed the resources 
of a powerful nation-state.155 The ‘terror famine’ of 1932–1933 punctuated the process of 
Russification in dour terms. The death of six to eleven million Ukrainians served as an 
effective deterrent against defiance of Soviet power, as well as a means to dilute the 
Ukrainian majority in the Soviet Socialist Republic.156 Smaller terrors, such as the 
purging of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1938 further sapped the region of the 
political resolve.157 Despite these tragedies, Ukrainians of the Soviet era were torn over 
how to respond to Soviet rule. While Socialist Empire-building was alienating for some 
nationalities, “for the Ukrainians (as under the Romanovs) the privileging of Russian was 
both attractive and repellent. It helped some identify more easily with the new ‘imperial’ 
culture, while for others the very insidious news of this temptation produced a backlash 
against the dangers of ‘Russification.’”158 This theme of “attractive and repellent” appeal 
of Russian influence would permeate Ukrainian society all the way through present day. 
Two events dominated Ukraine’s national formation after the beginning of the 
Second World War: the formation of a Ukrainian nationalist army under German 
occupation and the large and continually expanding Ukrainian diaspora. Ukraine’s 
second glimpse of freedom in twenty years came following the Red Army’s disastrous 
retreat ahead of the Wehrmacht onslaught in 1941. The newly “liberated” regions under 
German control sparked the short-lived success of the Ukrayins’ka Povstans’ka Armiya 
(UPA), or Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Vestiges of this force fought the returning Soviet 
army for almost a decade, but ultimately their resistance failed, resulting in the death or 
deportation of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians.159 These deported Ukrainians 
eventually formed a large community in eastern Siberia, and were part of a larger 
population of the inner-Soviet Ukrainian diaspora of between 6.8 million and 20 million 
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Ukrainians living in other regions of the Soviet Union by 1991.160 The outflow of 
Ukrainians to other parts of the USSR (as well as more than 1.6 million living in North 
America) and inflow of ethnic Russians to the major urban and industrial centers of the 
country, and Khrushchev’s “gift” of the Crimean peninsula to the Ukrainian SSR, created 
a distinct balance in Ukrainian and Russian cultural influences in the Socialist State. 
Russian was the dominant culture of the east and south, while Ukrainian still survived in 
the west. As a result, by 1989 “the number in Ukrainian language schools [in Galicia, 
Ukraine’s western region] was around 90 percent, in the Donbas [the country’s east] it 
was less than 10 percent and in Crimea zero.”161 
1. Russia’s Neighborhood Policy, Ethnonationalism, and Novorossiya 
Russian politicians and academics have produced numerous strategic, 
philosophical, and historical models to explain the current relationship between Russia 
and Ukraine. The Neighborhood Policy, Slavic Ethnonationalism, and Novorossiya are 
three such examples, and clearly influenced Russia’s 21st-century strategic approach. 
They fully embody Russia’s strategic methods of manipulating identity and exporting 
propaganda. These Russian tendencies grew especially pronounced after the turn of the 
twenty-first century, when following the Orange Revolution in 2004 it became apparent 
that Russia’s Slavic brother had an increasing desire to Europeanize. 
Russia devised its Neighborhood Policy to cope with Ukraine’s perceived 
“Western” treachery. The Neighborhood Policy was a popular, coercive strategy that 
appealed to a wide audience of Russian scholars and political leaders.162 Unlike Western 
policy initiatives which focused on soft power diplomacy, Russian adherents to the 
Neighborhood Policy leaders believe they can influence countries in their “near abroad” 
by creating geopolitical instability and coercion. Russian leaders determined they could 
exert power by attacking weak points in Ukrainian identity, effectively demonstrating 
Russia’s soft power prowess combined with belittling theories of ethnic assimilation and 
cooption. Instead of focusing on cultural or economic cooperation, Russia creates “points 
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of pressure...Points of infiltration, networks of influence....‘Soft power’ for Russia 
seemed to be any means of coercion not involving tanks.”163 According to Andrew 
Wilson, Russia’s “neighborhood policy” of soft power methods “meant bribing local 
politicians and setting up pro-Russian front parties and sending shadowy funding to pro-
Russian NGOs. It meant spending at least $8 billion a year on PR. It meant working 
through shadowy front companies like RosUkrEnergo in Ukraine.”164 It was through 
these techniques that Russia operated in anti-Western circles, and promoted further 
concepts of ethnonationalism and Novorossiya.  
Slavic ethnonationalists emphasize the strong ties between all Slavic people, 
specifically the Eastern Slavic nations of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, and their eventual 
unity under one nation-state.165 Russian leaders, academics, and media repeated 
ethnonational ideals throughout the spring of 2014, during the turbulent months between 
Yanukovych’s departure in February and Petro Poroshenko’s Presidential inauguration 
on June 7, 2014.166 Vice News reporters captured several examples of this feeling while 
covering the rising tensions in Crimea prior to Russia’s annexation. Following the 
capture of his base by pro-Russian separatists, a Ukrainian Marine says he continues to 
believe in a fraternal bond between Ukraine and Russia, calling Russians his Slavic 
Brothers, even despite their coercive actions.167 The same Vice News reporters also 
interview a group of Serbian volunteers who have come to Crimea to show their support 
for the Crimean referendum. During the interviews these Serbian volunteers often repeat 
their ethnonationalistic desire to support their Slavic Russian cousins and counter the 
forces of Western Fascism by which they meant the interim Ukrainian government.168 
According to a later study of foreign fighters in the Donbas, many Serbian volunteers 
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declared a close affinity for the Russian nation, they perceive “Ukraine as a fake, buffer, 
Kosovo-lite state that only exists to prevent Russian expansion and greatness, common 
amongst the Eurasianists, is also a potential mobilizing factor for the Serbs.”169 Though 
enlightening to the study of ethnic tensions in the region, ethnonationalistic thoughts are 
perhaps limited to those who would have already supported Russia’s actions in Crimea 
and the Donbas, and therefore not a significant motivating factor but rather a medium 
through which disaffected Slavs could verbalize their feelings of frustration. 
Russian leaders, academics, and media outlets also repeated the concept of 
Novorossiya during the chaotic spring of 2014, commonly along with claims that during 
this period of instability Ukraine could disintegrate into two or more pro-European or 
pro-Russian regional blocs.170 Novorossiya, or simply “new Russia,” is a nationalistic 
concept which came into common usage during the reign of Catherine the Great, and 
loosely referred to the geographic region conquered under her rule, specifically the 
northern coast of the Black Sea, which now includes land surrounding the present day 
cities of Kharkov, Lugansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Nikolayev, and Odessa.171 The tsars 
opened this sparsely populated region up to Russian settlement in the 1780s, encouraging 
migration through remittances from serfdom and promises of tenable land.172  
Although common usage of the term Novorossiya dwindled during the twentieth 
century, it came back into common Russian parlance following the annexation of Crimea. 
Putin publically addressed a question about Novorossiya during a Direct Line interview 
on April 17, 2014, saying he supported the concept, and going further to promise that 
Russia “would ‘fight for’ these people to be able ‘to defend their rights and determine 
their fate on their own.’”173 With endorsement by Putin, Novorossiya became 
“increasingly a part of Kremlin discourse” in 2014, but with the lack of further rebellion 
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in central and southern Ukraine in the summer of 2014, and the partial success of 
Ukraine’s Antiterrorism Operation (ATO), the likelihood of a Novorossiya revival in 
Ukraine is slim.174 Failure of pro-Russian forces to replicate Crimea-like rebellions in 
central and southern Ukraine effectively ended any real possibility of creating a new 
Russian contiguous territory, which also would have connected another breakaway region 
in Moldova, Transnistria, to the Russian Federation.175 
Support of Russia’s Neighborhood Policy, ethnonationalism, and Novorossiya cut 
to the core of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s vision of a Russian-dominated pole in 
the post-Soviet space. Putin summed up this perspective during his 2005 address on the 
State of the Federation, promoting the idea that today’s Russia is a nation divided: 
“Above all, we should acknowledge that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major 
geopolitical disaster of the century. As for the Russian nation, it became a genuine drama. 
Tens of millions of our co-citizens and compatriots found themselves outside Russian 
territory. Moreover, the epidemic of disintegration infected Russia itself.”176 Obviously, 
Putin is attempting to evoke feeling of nostalgia for the old regime, but he is also 
describing the disenfranchisement of millions of people, in this case ethnic Russians. 
Their separation from the Russian homeland is an international humiliation Russia 
continues to suffer, and one that was alleviated following the annexation of Crimea and 
return of one million of these waylaid citizens. Putin’s statement fully embodies the 
appeal of ethnonationalism and Novorossiya, and the power these concepts have over 
those who are now determining the future of the Ukrainian state.  
2. A Blended State and its Impact on Propaganda 
As stated in the introduction of this chapter, the ethnic makeup of Ukraine is not 
clearly divided along defined borders. Granted, Lviv is staunchly pro-Ukrainian and 
Crimea and the Donbas have supported pro-Russia politicians since the collapse of the 
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Soviet Union, but these regions represent the poles of the Ukrainian consciousness. In 
between these two poles, the country is a mix of ethnic and linguistic groups of primarily 
composed of Ukrainians and Russians, a mix made more confusing by the predominance 
of the Russian language among ethnic Ukrainians. By exploiting these characteristics of 
Ukrainian society, Russia can more easily export pro-Russian propaganda and manipulate 
Ukraine’s weak sense of identity. 
The definitive existence of geographically separated political and linguistic poles, 
between Ukraine’s European northwest and Eurasian southeast, forms the foundation of 
Ukraine’s ongoing identity crisis. Figure 2 shows how these poles have manifested 
themselves politically, through an electoral map of the 2010 presidential race between 
Yulia Tymoshenko, of the staunchly nationalistic All-Ukrainian Union “Fatherland” 
party, and Viktor Yanukovych, of the historically pro-Russian Party of Regions.  
Figure 2.  2010 Ukrainian Presidential Election Results 
 
Ukrainian electoral map showing east-west blurring of political poles between Yulia 
Tymoshenko’s All Ukrainian Party to the west and Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of 
Regions to the east and south. Source: “A divided Ukraine,” CNN, March 3, 2014, 
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2014/02/world/ukraine-divided/, source Ukraine Central 
Election Commission. 
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Tymoshenko won over 75 percent of the vote in the far western regions of the country 
while Yanukovych won over 75 percent of the vote in Crimea and the Donbas. Political 
preference becomes less defined as one moves away from the extreme northwest and 
southeast regions, essentially blending from one pole to the other, with central Ukraine 
acting as a mixed buffer of identity and political ideals. Russia’s constant attacks on the 
identity of the country along this ethnic no-mans-land is critical to the understanding of 
this thesis. 
Ukraine’s blended nature is also apparent in the ongoing prevalence of spoken 
and written Russian. Russian is used in Ukraine so extensively that it could be classified 
as a majority language: 
In Ukraine as a whole, the Ukrainian language is underused. The 
population is 79 per cent Ukrainian, but many speak Russian. There are 
various ways of measuring the prevalence of the two languages, but one 
yardstick is that 43 per cent speak Ukrainian at home and 39 per cent 
Russian, with 17 per cent saying both (data for 2011). But even the 
Ukrainian-speaking population is underserved. As of 2011, the top eight 
TV channels only had 22 per cent of their primetime content in Ukrainian; 
only 30 per cent of total newspaper circulation was in Ukrainian.177 
The predominance of Ukrainian and Russian language is concentrated in the same 
approximate northwest and southeast regional divide as the 2010 election results, as can 
be seen in Figure 3. Spoken Ukrainian is more prevalent in the northwest while Russian 
language dominates in the country’s southeast. 
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Figure 3.  Language Map of Ukraine 
 
Clearly shows the concentration of Russian speakers in the east and south of the country. 
Source: “A divided Ukraine,” CNN, March 3, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/ 
interactive/2014/02/world/ukraine-divided/, source 2001 Ukraine Census. 
Even in the Ukrainian-speaking west the language is underserved in visual, audio, 
and print media, making the population of Ukraine dependent on information sources 
published and exported from Russia in the Russian language. Russians take full 
advantage of this access by inundating Ukraine with propaganda-laden Russian language 
media.178 Through this propaganda Russia can accomplish two objectives: manipulate 
identity by co-opting sympathetic Russian-speakers (and introduce them to a pro-Russian 
mindset) or coerce an opposition government by threatening its sense of identity by 
exporting propaganda. Both fall under the manipulate identity strategic method and form 
the foundation for Russia’s exploitation strategy in Ukraine. 
The pull of Russian language and culture reaches into Ukraine through its 
airwaves, cables, and newsreels. In terms of identity politics in Ukraine, Russia has a 
clear edge in information warfare; and at little cost, Russian government owned and 
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controlled news corporations bombard vast audiences of Ukrainian citizens with 
propaganda.179 Information warfare as a form of ‘soft power’ is wielded differently in 
Russia than it is in the West. It is based on the application of pressure: “It involves not 
just the competition of ideas and information, but also the ‘latent information 
management of the opponent’s internal, economic and cultural processes’ and 
‘information-psychological aggression based on economic, political and diplomatic 
pressure.’ The stress is therefore more on ‘war’ than it is on ‘information.’”180 Ukraine, 
due to its weakened sense of identity, is particularly vulnerable to Russian pressures in 
this type of attack. 
One example of Russia’s exploitation of latent political pressures is through the 
echoing and amplification of Ukrainian political rhetoric, such as the Party of Regions’ 
constant denigration of opponents in Ukrainian media. The Party’s political ads 
commonly resorted to name-calling, labelling their rivals “extremists” and “fascists.” The 
use of “fascist” was particularly effective as a divisive label, as it “drew on a long-term 
Soviet legacy of ideological tirades against Ukrainian ‘bourgeois nationalists’ and ‘Nazi 
collaborators.’”181 Russia media outlets repeated this labelling and applied fabricated 
evidence, claiming to link pro-Western Ukrainian nationalists to ultra-conservative fascist 
groups in Europe and the United States.182 Oversimplification, embellishment, or simple 
fabrication of complicated Ukrainian political and social issues is a common Russian 
tactic, effectively bombarding the target audience with a corrupt and distorted message 
that creates tension and division. 
Another example of divisive media bombardment is Russia’s constant denigration 
of the Ukrainian people as unique ethnic group. These Russian claims vary from denials 
of the existence of ethnic Ukrainians (“Ukrainians are simply Russians”) to relegation of 
Ukrainians to a small Russian ethnic subgroup, or “little Russians.”183 This Russian 
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messaging, which is repeated on Russian language media and often by President Putin 
himself, attacks the already weakened bonds of identity that hold the Ukrainian nation 
together.184 Russia’s belittling of Ukrainian ethnicity is an enveloping maneuver that 
targets the flanks of Ukrainian identity while subversive support of ethnonationalism 
assaults the vanguard. One seeks to deny a people’s existence, and the other to unite it 
with a greater whole. By using both in tandem, Russia can strengthen its support within 
Ukraine. This cultural denigration also creates toxic in-groups and out-groups, and serves 
to dehumanize Russia’s political and civil opposition within Ukraine. 
Russia also exploits Ukrainian political blunders. Shortly after Yanukovych’s 
downfall, the Ukrainian Parliament passed a measure aimed at appeasing local 
nationalists and limiting Russia’s ‘soft power’ influence: The Ukrainian government 
would repeal a 2012 law that allowed regions to make Russian an official second 
language.185 Though this measure was not approved by interim President Oleksandr 
Turchynov, Russia media outlets seized upon this perfect opportunity, using the 
legislation’s passage in the Ukrainian Parliament as evidence that the Ukrainian 
government was trying to forcibly assimilate its ethnic Russian minority. Russian leaders 
and media outlets duly covered the political event as the drama unfolded in Kyiv,186 
spinning it by claiming its passage would mean “ethnic Russians would become second-
class citizens in Ukraine.”187 In Crimea, media coverage of the debacle corresponded 
with an immediate decline for support of the Euromaidan and jump in support for joining 
Russia.188 The narrative of threatened ethnic minorities resembles Russian justification 
for its intervention in the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, and plays into a common appeal 
painting Russia as the victim of Western aggression, and not as the aggressor itself.189  
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The provocation tactic is another popular Russian propaganda tool, and one that 
Russia has used since 1917. Provocation works like this: an undercover agent will pose as 
an opposition member, then encourage the activists to “issue statements or take actions 
that discredit Ukraine, and then [the provocateur sits] back as other Ukrainians and more 
important media in other countries blame Ukrainians for what the Russians are doing.”190 
Pro-Russian provocateurs launched these attacks numerous times during the crisis, 
notably during the Euromaidan as a means of delegitimizing the peaceful protestors there, 
and sowing distrust among various pro-Ukrainian political organizations. 
All these unique characteristics of the Ukrainian state make it incredibly 
vulnerable to Russian exploitation. The societal splits, illustrated in a distinct divide 
between the northwest and southeast, are dulled by the vast area of central Ukraine that 
represents a mix of both Ukrainian and Russian political views and language usage. The 
political chaos of Yanukovych’s departure combined with a weak and divided sense of 
identity assisted Russia in its exportation of propaganda and manipulation of identity. 
This section illustrated several complex variables of Ukraine’s ethnic identity: the 
following sections will demonstrate the historical perspective at Russia’s ethnic 
exploitation following the departure of Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko. 
B. PHASE ONE: THE YANUKOVYCH FAMILY’S REIGN 
Yanukovych’s four years as Ukraine’s president laid the groundwork for Russia’s 
mostly successful exploitative attack on ethnic divides within the country, once direct 
control through the corrupt politician ultimately failed. Yanukovych and his allies 
received substantial political support from the Russian government, through cash payouts 
and reciprocating clientelistic schemes, mostly regarding the Natural Gas industry.191 
Russia essentially used Yanukovych to weaken and corrupt the Ukrainian government, 
and keep it on track for continued support of Russian foreign policy objectives. Russia’s 
ability to infiltrate Ukraine in this manner, through the corrupting of the Yanukovych 
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Administration, cuts to the core of Ukraine’s identity weakness, and its propensity toward 
exploitation. Identity manipulation and propaganda were also central tenants to the 
Yanukovych Administration’s hold to power, as its leaders succumbed to Russian 
usurpation of the Ukrainian state and its population’s ethnic identity. 
Yanukovych’s family background perfectly embodies the diverse cultural, ethnic, 
and linguistic character of Ukrainian society. Yanukovych descends from Russian, 
Polish, and Belarusian ancestors, and although born in Ukraine, he is a native Russian 
speaker.192 He grew up a criminal and local tough in eastern Ukraine, involved heavily in 
the ethnically centered gang wars which raged across the region in the 1970s and 
1980s.193 By his thirties, Yanukovych began working for legitimate enterprises in the 
transportation industry, eventually taking up in politics following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. He rose through the ranks of the Party of Regions, which dominated the 
politics of the Russian-speaking east of the country, becoming the official party leader in 
2004.194 From these eastern roots, Yanukovych created his network of political and 
criminal power, which increased significantly following his election to President in 2010. 
This network consisted of both his fellow Party of Regions politicians and the corrupt and 
powerful mafia-like ‘family’ that developed around his criminal administration. 
The Party of Regional Revival of Ukraine, Labor Party, Party of Pensioners, Party 
of Ukrainian Solidarity, and For a Beautiful Ukraine Party merged in 2000, forming the 
Party of Regions. All five parties depended on Ukraine’s southeast for their base of 
support, and instead of representing the left or right, the newly formed Party of Regions 
set its policy positions around the basic interests of Ukrainian Russophiles.195 Well 
known cronyism and criminal behavior, the party “bribed, blackmailed, or coerced 
opposition deputies into defecting to the government coalition. When opponents could 
not be pressured to switch sides, they were denigrated in the media and subjected to 
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intimidation and repression.”196 The party also “relied on a highly divisive internal 
identity narrative, constantly inflaming domestic divisions to win elections.”197 Russia 
supported this policy, and as discussed previously, would often repeat and rebroadcast 
divisive language to Russian-speaking residents of Ukraine.198 In this way, the party 
acted as a pro-Russian megaphone allowing Russian propagandists to gain access to the 
Ukrainian people through ostensibly “legitimate” governmental institutions. The Party of 
Regions also dominated Crimea’s Parliament in the lead-up to the March 16 referendum, 
and their unity and pro-Russian support during the crisis was instrumental to Russia’s 
successful exploitation of ethnic divides on the peninsula.199 
The Yanukovych crime family which developed around the party network was 
also instrumental in achieving Russia’s goal of cutting off Ukrainian support for Western 
integration. The “family” consisted of Yanukovych’s kin and many of the key power 
brokers in eastern Ukraine. These political and entrepreneurial compatriots created a 
clientelistic system based on the region’s industrial resources of coal, steel, and gas. 
During Yanukovych’s presidency these “family” members increased their wealth through 
various forms of government theft and bribery.200 Several gangs of local toughs, or 
titushki, stirred up violence in the Maidan in late 2013, appearing as counter-protestors 
and provocateurs, regularly assaulting pro-European activists.201 Russia’s support of 
Yanukovych politically ultimately empowered the “family,” which continued to eat away 
at the country’s economic livelihood through corruption and clientelism.202 By 2014, 
Yanukovych had amassed an enormous personal fortune amounting to approximately 
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$100 billion dollars,203 on the backs of the Ukrainian people and with the direct support 
of the Russian government. 
The protests of the Euromaidan represented many aspects of Ukrainian life, and 
an outlet of severe frustration and disappointment with the Yanukovych Administration. 
It was an extension of the feelings of the Orange Revolution in 2004, and a clear vote for 
closer ties with the West. It represented the Ukrainian people’s ability to unite as one 
majority, a majority of Ukrainians who supported a Western-aligned future, not a Russian 
one. This was a dangerous proposition for the Putin Administration, and could have been 
the catalyst that would solidify most of the country around a single ideal of Ukrainian 
national feeling. So when the crowds would not disperse even after snipers bullets killed 
50–100 protestors,204 the then-leaders of Ukraine and Russia made two critical decisions. 
First, Yanukovych decided to flee Ukraine, leaving with billions of dollars of stolen 
wealth, and Putin decided to set in motion a plan to annex Crimea and potentially much 
more of southern and eastern Ukraine 
The Party of Regions and Yanukovych crime family both collapsed following 
Viktor Yanukovych’s late-night flight from the capital on February 22, 2014. By the May 
presidential elections, many of the Party of Regions’ parliamentarians had defected to 
other parties. Its Presidential candidate, Mykhailo Dobkin, won just three percent of the 
national vote during the 2014 presidential elections.205 Similarly, much of Yanukovych’s 
“family” followed the ex-President’s lead and fled the country. Yanukovych’s networks, 
and their Russophile culture, had weakened Ukraine through “heightened regional and 
ethnocultural tension,” creating regional rifts that were exacerbated during the 
Euromaidan.206 These weaknesses, and Russia’s longtime support of the Party of Regions 
and the ‘family’, were instrumental in dividing the country. The graft and ineptitude 
fostered by Russia’s support degraded the bonds of society in Ukraine and lead many 
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ethnic Russians to believe that they would be better off under the Putin Regime, where at 
least there was economic opportunity and nationalistic unity. Ultimately, Russia could 
not prop up Yanukovych’s faltering regime with the networks of support it laid in place 
during most of the 2000s. 
C. PHASE TWO: THE SECOND CRIMEAN WAR AND THE LITTLE 
GREEN MEN WHO WON IT 
Foreign armed and financed guerrillas are a favored weapon of states wishing to 
wage war below the radar of armed conflict. It creates ambiguity and plausible 
deniability, key components to Russia’s exploitative ethnic strategy, which went into full 
swing in early 2014. In Crimea, Russian strategy was focused on exploiting presence, 
specifically the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet.  
Russian officials often deny obvious facts to an absurd degree. The sudden 
appearance of “little green men” throughout Crimea in February and March 2014 
provides a fitting example. When asked about these masked and mysterious men in 
uniform, President Vladimir Putin claimed they were merely local defense militias, 
organized by concerned Crimeans.207 In reality, these armed men “were actually from the 
military units of the Black Sea Fleet; from [the] East Chechen battalion, the 31st Guards 
brigade, the 22nd brigade of special GRU [Main Intelligence Directorate] troops, and 
other military units.”208 In early 2014, these soldiers played a major role in destabilizing 
the situation in Crimea, primarily by protecting and emboldening pro-Russian separatists 
and coordinating with their attacks. 
In Crimea, these “little green men” undermined the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ 
ability to respond decisively to protestor occupations of key administrative centers and 
prevent the staging of a separatist referendum. The masked men also provided an 
assuring presence to pro-Russian protestors that rallied outside of Ukrainian military 
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bases, acting as armed security.209 When the time was right to occupy a Ukrainian 
military base, the protestors and “little green men” joined forces. After protestors 
destroyed security gates or other obstacles, the armed men used the chaos of the crowd as 
cover to secure the compound.210 The coordination between the “little green men” and 
pro-Russian protestors is a key component of Russia’s exploitative strategy; and as long 
as doubt lingered as to the identity of the “little green men”, the tactic helped establish a 
consistent storyline of an organic, cohesive, and determined pro-Russian movement that 
acted outside of Moscow’s control. 
Exploiting presence was key to the employment of the “little green men.” These 
units were able to rapidly deploy to trouble spots thanks to Russia’s basing agreements, 
allowing thousands of well-trained and equipped Russian troops near instantaneous 
access to the region if the need for action presented itself. In January of 2014, 
approximately 35,000 Russian Federation troops were stationed in Crimea, outnumbering 
the 20,000 Ukrainian service members also stationed on the peninsula.211 The presence 
of major Russian military installations on Crimea, as well as the large proportion of 
ethnic Russians serving in Ukrainian military units on the peninsula, proved instrumental 
to Russia’s exploitation of ethnic division in Ukraine. Proximity to major metropolitan 
areas not only allowed swift movement of Russian forces, it provided cover for those 
forces among the friendly ethnic Russian population. The Ukrainian servicemen 
experienced the opposite: receiving no orders to counter Russian military moves and 
remaining sequestered in their bases.212 Disenchanted by their government’s response, 
and perhaps sympathetic to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, many ethnically Russian 
members of Ukraine’s armed services, including the head of Ukraine’s Navy, Rear 
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Admiral Denys Berezovsky, defected to the Russian side.213 Using masked and 
unidentified “little green men” in combination with close proximity to regular Russian 
troops, gave pro-Russian forces decisive local superiority. Bluntly denying that these men 
were regular Russian forces was an audacious touch aimed at degrading the ability of the 
West (specifically the United States and EU member states) to effectively intervene. 
D. PHASE THREE: BOMBAST IN THE DONBAS 
While effective in Crimea, Russia could not replicate the same strategy of using 
“little green men” in the Donbas. Russian troops did not enjoy the same level of access 
and legitimacy they did in Crimea, where per their lease agreement with Ukraine, 
Russian forces were authorized to enact protective measures if the local commander 
deemed it necessary.214 In the Donbas, circumstances forced Russia to turn to a more 
classic mix of irregular warfare tactics, to include the strategic methods of exporting 
propaganda, arming insurgents, supplying fighters, and exploiting presence. 
In the early days of unrest in the Donbas, the initial agitators were genuine 
Ukrainian citizens, though they did receive some assistance from Russian government 
advisors. Most of the separatists were ethnic Russians, who made up approximately 38.5 
percent of the population of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, concentrated primarily in 
larger urban centers. The Russian language also dominates, with 72 percent of residents 
reporting their “native language” is Russian.215 These Russophiles provided a potentially 
large pool of fighters. Early in the crisis in eastern Ukraine, anti-Ukrainian Russian media 
served a central role in motivating a minority of the eastern population to rebel. One 
method used by pro-Russian media outlets was to exaggerate the threat posed by 
Ukrainian ultranationalist groups such as Right Sector to the Russian-speaking east: 
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According to April data from the Donetsk Institute for Social Research 
and Policy Analysis, 60% of Donetsk residents feared “Bandera 
supporters” [Right Sector] and 50% dreaded the Kiev authorities. 
Irrational terror has become the main source of the renewal of separatist 
sentiments in the Donbass region throughout April-May 2014.216 
Motivated by calls to action, small and moderately armed groups began to organize in 
April and May of 2014, taking advantage of early Kyivan government. These forces 
managed to capture several cities and towns in the region, relying primarily on arms 
provided by local oligarchs and captured weapons depots.217 These forces achieved 
several embarrassing successes in the early spring, including the highly publicized 
surrender of an entire platoon of Ukrainian armored personnel carriers to an unarmed 
crowd of pro-Russian protestors.218 Motivated and idealistic, the early pro-Russian 
separatists rallied around the belief that they were fighting against an illegitimate fascist 
government in Kyiv that had overthrown their favored candidates, effectively 
undermining their political voice.219 
The wholesale influx of Russian equipment, and later personnel, did not begin 
until summer 2014. In the months of June and July, the Ukrainian Government offensive 
started to build momentum, capturing Slovyansk and besieging the separatist strongholds 
of Donetsk and Luhansk. After the success of the Ukrainian government’s ATO, 
evidence began to mount of vast quantities of Russian equipment flowing into the 
country through checkpoints not controlled by the Ukrainian government.220 Despite the 
fact that Russia and Ukraine share the use of several weapon systems, Armament 
Research Services identified several “tagged” weapons systems used by the separatists 
that could only have originated from Russian arsenals, including modern and updated 
variants of the MT-LB Armored Personnel Carrier, T-72B Main Battle Tank, and 
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1RL239 Battlefield Surveillance Radar Vehicle.221 Several examples of Russian-supplied 
heavy equipment now sit in Kyiv’s Museum of the Great Patriotic War, with placards 
indicating their manufacturing numbers as proof of their Russian origin. Without 
additional military equipment the rebellion would have fallen apart. Russia maintained a 
steady stream of material support for the separatists, but even that was not enough to 
prevent their capitulation. There simply were too few Ukrainian fighters to stand up to 
the government forces.  
When local manpower could no longer fill the requirement for fighters, and failed 
to hold back the onslaught of the ATO, Russia sent its own citizens into the breech. These 
legions of Russian volunteer fighters flowed into the Donbas in the summer of 2014, 
made up of both disgruntled Russian veterans and radical political ideologues. Many 
were veterans of Russia’s wars in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Georgia, but others were 
simply politicized rightist nationalists eager to export their ideology.222 These volunteers 
were invaluable in the early stages of Russia’s wholesale commitment to the rebellion. 
To fill the ranks of fighters, Russian conscription officers looked for military 
veterans with a very specific background: 
The ideal candidate was a seasoned and battle-hardened veteran who was 
now eking out a living as a security guard, in construction or as a driver, 
preferably with debts and/or an unhappy home life; or alternatively, a 
young man who had recently completed his military service and was 
experiencing difficulty in re-adjusting and finding a niche in the civilian 
world.223 
These recruits were promised high pay, the equivalent of hundreds of U.S. dollars a day, 
to fight and operate the heavy weaponry that began to flow into Ukraine from border 
checkpoints controlled by separatist forces.224 By August, these military veterans 
numbered 6,500, providing valuable combat experience and tactical know-how to the 
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local Donbas fighters, many of whom came from the steel and coal industry and had little 
practical military experience.225 It is important to differentiate these veterans, who had 
left military service prior to volunteering, from the regular Russian forces, which were 
persuaded or coerced to fight in Ukraine at a later stage in the conflict. 
The second pool of recruits came from Russia’s network of “politicized 
supporters of Russian neo-imperialist organizations.”226 After they signed up, these 
recruits headed to a series of paramilitary training camps—many set up by Viktor 
Yanukovych’s son, Oleksander227—established near the Ukrainian border.228 Those that 
survived the intense fighting of 2014 managed to form “powerful fraternal combat bonds 
and networks with men whom they would otherwise never have met.”229 Politicized 
fighters also hailed from other countries throughout the world (from neighboring Belarus 
to faraway Brazil), but these volunteers never numbered more than a few hundred.230 
Today, Russian soldiers make up approximately one-third (nearly 10,000) of the fighters 
in the Donbas, as the prevalence of veteran and ideologue fighter networks continues to 
diminish.231 
The Russian strategic method of exploiting presence was also in play during this 
phase. During the increase in fighting in the summer of 2014, 42,000 Russian troops 
participated in exercises mere miles from the Ukrainian border.232 The presence of 
Russian regular forces operating along Ukraine’s borders during the insurgency played a 
deterrent role, representing a conventional threat. Their presence aggressive and decisive 
military action on behalf of the ATO, thus enabling Russia to extend the conflict and 
draw effective forces away from the Donbas.  
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In this phase, which is still ongoing though noticeably cooling, Russia heavily 
employed its strategic methods of exporting propaganda, arming insurgents, supplying 
fighters, and exploiting presence. These methods, though less covert as the conflict 
dragged on, kept the Ukrainian state unstable and reactionary, unable to coalesce 
effectively and fight an urban insurgency. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Russia was able to exploit linguistic and ethnic divides in Ukraine systematically, 
beginning with a wide-ranging information warfare campaign composed of both 
ideological and propaganda elements, and ending with a classic irregular warfare 
strategy. By using these methods, Russia successfully knocked Ukraine off its balance in 
early 2014, allowing it to easily annex Crimea in March, and establish a powerful 
foothold in the Donbas by the fall. Russia’s approach also knocked the West off-balance., 
Russian and pro-Russian forces blended sufficiently within the background of legitimate 
public discontent to create a situation that stymied the West’s ability to act decisively. 
Russia created enough doubt and ambiguity to discourage an early unified Western 
response, and more comprehensive sanctions were leveled only after separatists (or 
perhaps Russian forces under the guise as separatists) brought down Malaysian Airlines 
Flight 17. 
1. Minsk II and Beyond 
The long-term consequences of Russia’s exploitative ethnic strategy in Ukraine 
are yet to be seen. As of the beginning of September 2015 it appears as though violence 
in the Donbas is subsiding, with the Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko begrudgingly 
accepting the terms of the Minsk II agreement.233 The predicted separatist counter-
offensive toward Mariupol and Slovyansk has yet to materialize. The most likely result of 
the current stalemate is another frozen conflict along Russia’s periphery, but NATO’s 
initial refusal (or inability) to become directly involved in the Ukraine crisis may end up 
being a stroke of incredible luck. Russia can ill-afford further drags on its bank accounts 
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in the form of another needy breakaway region. Western sanctions remain in place, and 
oil has fallen well below the $110-a-barrel price tag required to keep the Russian 
government solvent.234 As Russia drifts into recession there may be enough impetus to 
spark another round of anti-Putin demonstrations, endangering the regime. 
The Ukrainian crisis shows that the West is not well suited to counter Russian 
exploitative attacks, relegating them and the Ukrainian government to a reactive position, 
wherein both must spend vast resources in both time and treasure to counter every 
Russian method.235 Defensive strategies, if forced into play in this manner, are time 
consuming and inefficient. In this “hybrid warfare” domain, Russia (acting offensively) 
has a decisive advantage, as it can use its local, cultural influence, specifically the 
prevalence of the Russian language, as a means to manipulate foreign populations in real 
time and from within those populations. Therefore: 
Putin is doing an end run around the West which ‘condemns any 
application of force by the state but does not take note of force if it comes 
from ‘activists,’ ‘social organizations’ or ‘the people.’ That Western 
failure opens the way for those using Putin’s tactics to use them ever more 
widely.236  
But this exploitation of ethnic divides can be, and has been, countered. In the Baltic 
States, governments have established their own media networks designed to satiate the 
need for Russian language media in their Russian-speaking citizens.237 This counter-‘end 
around’ circumvents the ability of Russian news outlets to penetrate other countries. 
NATO and other international organizations can assist Ukraine by providing a means of 
establishing Russian content media for the Ukrainian population that fulfills the need for 
information, while screening out Russian propaganda. 
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2. Ethnic Conflict, Insurgency, or Hybrid War? 
The ethnic dimension of the Ukraine Crisis makes the understanding of Russia’s 
involvement of major difficulty for outsiders to comprehend. Is it an ethnic conflict, 
insurgency, or something else?  
Given the research conducted for this thesis, one might expect the author to argue 
that the Ukraine Crisis falls under the category of ethnic conflict. The disparate fighting 
groups in the country, especially nationalistic “volunteer battalions,” are often ethnically 
vague, adhering to no strong “code” or pure concept of self. There is no clear distinction 
between the “us” and the “them” which divides ethnic and nationalistic identities. If one 
recalls, the definition used in this thesis for ethnic conflict is “a struggle in which the aim 
is to gain objectives and simultaneously neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals.”238 
Therefore it is difficult to ascertain which rivals each group is struggling against. Are the 
separatists fighting an illegitimate government, subversive fascist elements, or ethnic 
Ukrainians? It is simply unclear, making the labeling of the conflict as an ethnic war 
dubious. Despite this ambiguity, what is apparent is that language and identity do play a 
major role in the reasons for fighting, but not to the extent to which it can be defined as 
an ethnic conflict. 
What about an insurgency? Defined as “an organized rebellion aimed at 
overthrowing a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed 
conflict.”239 Often, the definition of insurgency is refined to imply internal, not external 
actors. If the orchestrators of the Ukraine Crisis were Ukrainian citizens, then this 
definition would fit perfectly within the context of an insurgency; however, Russia is 
attempting to use violence to change the political order. Russia is an external entity. 
Russia is using manipulation and violence internally within Ukraine. Granted a sizeable 
contingent of the fighters in Ukraine are in fact Ukrainian, but they only make up a third 
of the total fighters, and are entirely dependent on Russian reinforcements, command and 
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control, and equipment.240 The Crimean Republic, Donetsk People’s Republic, or 
Luhansk People’s Republic share few common characteristics with the guerrilla 
organizations established by Mao, Min, or Che. 
The term “hybrid war” seems appropriate to define the ballet being performed in 
Ukraine today. Frank G. Hoffman defines the hybrid threat as “any adversary that 
simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular 
tactics, terrorism, and criminal behavior in the battlespace to obtain their political 
objectives.”241 He lists four principle modes and means of hybrid warfare: conventional 
warfare, irregular warfare, terror/violence, and criminal behavior. Richard M. Crowell 
expands upon Hoffman’s “fused mix” definition, adding three additional modes and 
means: networks, coercion/co-opting, and information warfare.242 This thesis focused on 
at least four of these modes and means, and additional study of the conflict would 
absolutely uncover evidence of the remaining three. Using this definition, it is clear that 
Russia is engaged in hybrid war where exploitation of Ukrainian and Russian ethnic and 
linguistic groups is a key element. Without the already present divides in Ukraine, 
Russia’s ability to wage hybrid war would have been severely limited, possibly resulting 
in a more dangerous, at least for the international world, conflict. 
3. A Successful Gambit? 
Though a thorough discussion of the power of each Russian strategic method to 
exploit ethnic divides will be revealed in the following chapter, three general 
observations vis-à-vis Russia’s ability to achieve its strategic objectives are illuminated 
bellow. 
Russia was able to build a slight increase in regional hegemony through their 
assault on Ukraine. Annexation of Crimea, long believed to have been part of Russia 
since the reign of the Romanovs, added two million citizens to Russia’s population and 
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ten thousand square miles to its country. Russia now, especially after Minsk II, exercises 
incredible influence over the fate of the DNR and LNR, and is setting itself up as the 
arbiter of peace in the region, similar to the end result in Georgia’s ethnic conflicts. 
Ukraine also remains an unstable country, still fighting rampant corruption and outdated 
institutional structures. All signs point to a new frozen conflict in Ukraine, which will 
increase Russia’s power and control within its area of interest. 
 As in the Georgian case, Russia did not decrease the Ukrainian government and 
people’s desire to more closely align with the West. Russia, through its aggression has 
actually done more to accelerating this move, at least in the short term, then to stymie it. 
Ukraine is experiencing a painful but promising period of nationalism and unity, 
potentially unlike any other period in the country’s short history. By annexing Crimea, 
Russia has absorbed the most pro-Russian region of the country, one that proclaimed 
unceasing support for Russia. Without representatives of Crimea in the Ukrainian 
Parliament, the country is more unified. Partition does make NATO and EU accession 
problematic, however, as the alliances are unlikely to admit members with unresolved 
territorial disputes, not to mention the unwillingness of some states toward provoking 
Russia further.  
Finally, Russia actually decreased its perception as a great power, at least 
internationally. Russia is now more isolated than at any other time since the Bolshevik 
Revolution. This can no more clearly be seen as through the ongoing sanctions and 
Russia’s ejection from the G8. Domestically, however, the Putin regime continues to ride 
a wave of popular support and revived national pride. 
Ultimately the costs of Russian intervention in Ukraine will outweigh the benefits, 
and will prove to be a culminating point in Russia’s ability to shape world and domestic 
affairs. The country’s strategic objectives of creating a regional hegemony, decreasing 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 77 
IV. CONCLUSION: STRATEGIC APTITUDE OR MISGUIDED 
INEPTITUDE 
We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more 
positive and constructive picture of [the] sort of world we would like to 
see than we have put forward in past. It is not enough to urge people to 
develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in 
Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are 
less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking 
guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than 
Russians to give them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will. 
—George Kennan, Long Telegram 
 
A. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 
Russia has used consistent strategic methods in both the Georgian and Ukrainian 
cases, demonstrating a historical perspective and an ability to replicate the successes of 
the past. The similar use of these six strategic methods in both the Georgian and 
Ukrainian case demonstrate Russia’s consistent and quantifiable exploitation of ethnic 
divides as part and parcel to the country’s achievement of its strategic objectives. Their 
use also demonstrates a logical process of strategic thinking on behalf of Russian policy 
makers, though the long-term impact of this approach to foreign policy is problematic. 
1. Exporting Propaganda 
Exporting propaganda is Russia’s most efficient, affordable, and impenetrable 
means of achieving its three main strategic objectives, and has been exercised in a way 
that puts independent and democratic Western media at a distinct disadvantage.  
Russian propaganda is efficient in that Russian remains the lingua franca of a 
large (though declining) diaspora of post-Soviet peoples. Efficiency also reflects the short 
time it takes for Russian media outlets to release an anti-Western or anti-
Georgian/Ukrainian story. Meanwhile, the need to form a cogent and reasonable response 
often slows effective Western counterpoints from reputable media sources. As long as the 
governments opposing Russia remain in a reactive posture, Russian outlets, which are not 
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abashed of embellishing, lying, or manipulating, will maintain a distinct strategic 
advantage. 
Exporting propaganda is also affordable. Though the Russian Government pays 
approximately $8 billion a year on its government-owned news networks, this money 
goes to serve numerous purposes.243 It represents a coercive/cooptive tool in the “near 
abroad” surely, but also a way to maintain an air of purpose for the Russian population. 
This is an important means of creating the impression that Russia remains a great power, 
crediting the Putin Regime with repeated international successes. Domestic propaganda, 
in this regard, remains incredibly important. 
Finally, exporting propaganda is impenetrable, in that it alone does not elicit a 
powerful or united diplomatic counterattack, especially from the Western powers. It is 
difficult for organizations such as the EU and NATO to justify anything other than 
counter-messaging campaigns, essentially their own propaganda, which does not 
endanger the Russian government in the same manner Russian propaganda weakens 
Georgia’s or Ukraine’s society. This is primarily because the cost of creating falsehoods 
and mischaracterizations is considerably cheaper (in both time and money) than the cost 
of refuting them. Vitriolic rhetoric alone does not justify any sort of coherent 
international response, diplomatically or militarily, to Russia’s revanchist storyline. 
In these contexts, exporting propaganda to Georgia and Ukraine is and will 
remain a powerful and consistent strategic method for dividing Russian-speaking 
populations weakened by a poor sense of identity. The export of propaganda has created 
pockets of pro-Russian sentiment outside of Russia proper, assisting in the establishment 
of a regional zone of influence. By dominating the message in these areas, with consistent 
anti-Western rhetoric, Russian media has simultaneously expanded its status as a regional 
hegemon and limited Western influence. Finally, by the dual-use nature of propaganda, 
Russia is able to build its own case, at least domestically, that it is working to regain its 
great power status. 
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2. Manipulating Identity 
Manipulating identity manifested itself in Georgia through of the issuance of 
passports in Georgia’s breakaway regions, but Russia took a different route in Ukraine (it 
is unclear if Russia actually replicated passport issuance in Ukraine prior to the crisis). 
The manipulation of Ukrainian identity is mostly a condition of similar culture and 
shared history. Often-extolled concepts of ethnonationalism and Novorossiya are clear 
examples of the permeability of Ukrainian society, and its weakness to identity 
manipulation. Russian propagandists focused on the Crimean referendum as its 
precedence, using a basic appeal to Crimean popular support for unification with Russia 
as a manipulative tool to undermine Ukrainian identity.  
Manipulating identity serves the purpose of gaining an axis of attack or casus 
belli, but does not necessarily facilitate the achievement of Russia’s three main 
objectives. If anything, Russia placed itself at odds with those countries that feel most 
threatened by Russian revanchism, notably the Baltic States, Kazakhstan, and to some 
extent Belarus, when it began taking coercive measures designed to manipulate the 
definition of a Russian citizen. More generally, a Russophile strategy does not work if the 
goal is ultimately to recreate a multinational sphere of influence with some claim to 
general credibility. It is difficult for Russia to set itself up as the natural guardian and 
protector of Eurasia if its policy is concerned principally with protecting Russians from 
the other inhabitants in that very region! Because of an overly specific focus on Russian 
citizens, the country’s intent is unclear, and therefore the surrounding states have taken 
measures to blunt Russian attempts to undermine their own people: by firming up their 
own definitions of citizenship or by limiting the density or control ethnic Russians have 
within their borders.244 Therefore, Russia’s strategy of manipulating identity, though a 
small part of their exploitative policies in Georgia and Ukraine, have served as a warning 
that their own Russian populations may be targeted in similar fashion, and allowing them 
to take actions to prevent the same fate from befalling them. By appeasing the ethnic 
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Russian audience to the expense of all other ethnicities and nationalities, Russia has 
reduced its ability to interfere in other countries in their neighborhood, thereby reducing 
their regional power. 
There is also a weak case that manipulating identity degrades pro-Western 
sentiment. Even during the takeover of eastern Ukrainian administrative centers, polls of 
the general population revealed that most citizens, even in the Donbas, preferred 
reimagining part of Ukraine.245 Polling has shown Russian manipulation of identity in 
Georgia and Ukraine have unified the majority populations of each country, and 
accelerated their desire to align with the West. 
Finally, Russia has not been able to translate the possible inclusion of small 
populations of new citizens into an increase in their great power status. The populations 
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (with few ethnic Russians) number less than 350,000, and 
Crimea only approximately 2.5 million (a majority ethnic Russian).246 Though these are 
sizeable populations relative to their home countries of Georgia and Ukraine, these 
potentially new citizens comprise less than a two percent increase in Russia’s current 
population of 147 million (population is significant because it represents is an important 
metric of international power), but this small increase in citizens pales in comparison to 
the overall decline in Russia’s population, which some experts predict could dip below 
100 million by 2050.247 Russia has also taken away potentially powerful “internal 
lobbies” by supporting independence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and annexation in 
Crimea. Had these regions remained part of their mother countries, they could have acted 
as powerful political blocks that promote pro-Russian policies. Once separated, Russia no 
longer wields that ability to influence internal politics of Georgia and Ukraine.248 
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By manipulating identity, Russia only achieved minor foreign policy gains, 
establishing a casus belli for action in its “near abroad.” Thus, this particular strategic 
method is considerably less effective than many of the others in a broad foreign policy 
perspective, though better at influencing Russia’s policies in the Russian diaspora. 
3. Arming Insurgents 
Arming separatists alone has not been a successful method of achieving Russian 
strategic objectives. In both cases, the Russian-armed separatist forces were unable to 
defeat Georgian and Ukrainian government troops without additional direct support from 
regular Russian military units. Arming separatists does, however, provide enough cover 
to allow Russia’s actions to fly under the radar of Western willingness to decisively 
respond to aggression by muddying the waters of what constitutes an aggressive action. It 
is difficult to postulate what the Western response would have been if Russia unilaterally 
and conventionally invaded either country without first establishing enough “cover” for 
their action. 
Superior arms do grant the ability of one group to monopolize the use of force 
within a territory, a characteristic of government control, thus giving separatist regimes 
the appearance of unified legitimacy and strengthening their argument for the right for 
self-rule. Where those groups received their weapons does not mean much to the civilians 
living under them. To this effect, arming insurgents has allowed Russia to expand its area 
of influence into the regions held by its proxies, marginally increasing Russia’s status as 
a regional hegemon, and limiting Western access to the region through military force. But 
influence over the armed men of a few breakaway regions, who’s forces in Ukraine 
number less than 20,000 fighters, does not bolster Russia’s power status, not unless those 
forces are eventually converted into regular Russian soldiers. Instead, the drain on 
finances over the long run may have a negative effect on Russia’s ability to demonstrate 
its power. With each new frozen conflict the Russian government hemorrhages a bit more 
treasure. 
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4. Supplying Fighters 
Similar to supplying arms, facilitating the recruitment, travel, and training of 
fighters has not substantially contributed to any direct gains in Russian strategic 
objectives in Georgia or Ukraine, but the use of this strategic method has acted to confuse 
the true nature of Russian assistance by providing plausible deniability. Russian leaders 
can claim they are taking no part in the conflicts and that those doing the fighting are not 
under their control or jurisdiction once they cross Russia’s borders. Again, this gives 
Russia sufficient cover to use violence without serious Western military retaliation. 
Russia has facilitated the influx of foreign fighters to serve as a coercive measure 
meant to destabilize another country, not necessarily as a means to achieve a decisive 
outcome. The likelihood any of the separatist armies to win outright military victory in 
Georgia or Ukraine is low, even with the aid of foreign Russian fighters; but by keeping 
the manpower tap open, a trickle of trained and experienced foreign guerrillas could 
indefinitely prolong a conflict. Therefore, foreign fighters do help to increase Russia’s 
regional influence and undermine the pro-Western governments under attack. 
Sending her citizens abroad to fight in foreign conflicts may actually weaken 
Putin’s Regime in the long run. As these Russians, especially the politicized ideologues, 
return home from the fighting they bring with them numerous useful tools for a possible 
future insurgency. Ironically this seems to be a factor the Russian government has chosen 
to ignore. Many of the same soldiers recruited to fight in the Donbas were radical rightist 
nationalists protesting Putin’s third presidential run in 2011, so they clearly do not 
demonstrate any particularly strong allegiance to the regime.249 As Russia’s economic 
situation worsens, the likelihood of more protests and instability increases, and in turn 
these possibly disillusioned radicals may take the lessons they learned fighting in Georgia 
and Ukraine and apply them to a future struggle against the Russian government. 
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5. Exploiting Presence 
Close proximity to vital areas granted Russian military forces a decisive 
advantage in both the 2008 Russo-Georgian War and in the Crimean Anschluss. Rapidly 
deployed Russian troops were able to take key objectives and reinforce pro-Russian 
resistance within short timeframes, overwhelming Georgian and Ukrainian government 
forces on the ground, and demonstrating Russia’s unique ability to project power. South 
Ossetia’s control of the Roki tunnel and the comparatively long and open Russian-
Ukrainian border gives Russian forces a decisive logistic advantage, one that can be 
leveraged at any time to deter Georgian or Ukrainian action. Russia’s rapid deployment 
capability also supports the viewpoint that Russia has increased its hegemonic power in 
Eurasia. 
Presence of Russian forces has also effectively limited the West’s ability to 
penetrate these regions. Not even the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe 
has access to hundreds of miles of the Russian-Ukrainian border, simply because 
separatists control access.250 By dominating the security environment on the ground 
through proxies, Russia essentially controls the leavers of power. 
Russia also leverages its peacekeeping mission as a means to insert combat forces 
on to adversary territory. Russia’s continuing contribution of “peacekeepers” to South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia gives credence to Russia’s claim as a great power, one able to 
“stabilize” countries through the provision of security forces, like the U.S. in Afghanistan 
or French in Mali. The ability to provide peace keepers is generally seen in the 
international community as a means to enhance one’s country’s status, and in the 
Georgian case this may be a significant effect among Russia’s allies and its own loyal 
people.251 
                                                 
 250 Socor, “Action Plan.” 
 251 United Nations Peacekeeping, “What is Peacekeeping?” United Nations, accessed November 
18, 2015, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/peacekeeping.shtml. 
 84 
6. Freezing Conflicts 
Through creating frozen conflicts, Russia achieved its primary goal of building a 
regional hegemony, for now the country can leverage its control over the breakaway 
governments in response to actions by Georgia and Ukraine. Russia can also use 
continued economic and military superiority to back separatist armed forces, therefore 
ensuring ongoing Russian hegemonic dominance in the region, at least for the foreseeable 
future.252 
Despite this advantage, Russia failed significantly in its attempt to decrease 
Western influence in Georgia and Ukraine by perpetuating frozen conflicts. Instead, 
Russian meddling has solidified the anti-Russian and pro-Western leanings of a majority 
of each country’s population. Though this desire is a far cry from assuring either’s 
ascendance into the Western security and economic order, the populations of both 
governments have continually expressed their desire to align their political future with the 
West. Unless serious electoral upheaval occurs, there is little chance either country will 
begin to drift back into Russia’s orbit. 
What long-term effect sustaining frozen conflicts has had on Russia’s great power 
status remains unseen. None of Russia’s satellite regions contribute to Russia 
economically, all draining funds from Moscow’s already overstretched treasury. The 
regions’ attitudes toward Russia also waft from full allegiance to temperamental 
insolence; Russia has had to intervene into South Ossetian and Abkhazian affairs directly 
on several occasions to ensure its interests, and not those of the regions’ inhabitants, were 
protected. In all reality, after Russia has frozen a conflict, it no longer has much direct 
effect on the power equation, since each region is so small and contributes very little 
economically. Obviously, Crimea’s annexation contributed greatly to heightened Russian 
nationalism and impression of Russian power, but Crimea never entered the lexicon as a 
frozen conflict. 
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B. OVERALL ASSESSMENT 
The annexation of Crimea and support of South Ossetian and Abkhazian 
independence are seen favorably in Russia, and by supporting these policies, the Putin 
regime has been able to demonstrate power at home. Putin has achieved his goal of 
regaining the trust of the Russian people and depicting himself as a leader who can bring 
honor, power, and dignity back to the country, but domestic support does not directly 
translate into foreign policy success. Exploitative policies in Georgia and Ukraine have 
served as a unifying force, solidifying the anti-Russian opinions of each population. 
Instead of strengthening a regional hegemonic bloc to counter the West, Russia’s control 
of its own pole is essentially limited to the current members of the Eurasian Economic 
Union: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Georgian and Ukraine continue 
to drift West, despite Russia’s vast investment of diplomatic, military, and economic 
capital.  
Though effective in achieving strategic objectives in the near term, Russia’s 
divide and rule ethnic exploitation strategy has not been paying off. Russia today is more 
isolated than ever, and is suffering under the heel of economic sanctions and the global 
slump in oil prices. Despite isolation and economic hardship, Putin remains in power. So, 
if these strategies arise from the simple purpose of maintaining his seat in the Kremlin, 
then they are doing their part. Further isolation of Putin’s regime, however, may cause it 
to lower the bar for provocation, increasing the possibility of another dangerous Crimean 
adventure. 
Exploiting ethnic conflict can only produce results through sustained and 
enthusiastic support of local populations. Support in Crimea was more than sufficient 
toward the relatively peaceful (though illegal and internationally condemned) transfer of 
sovereignty from Ukraine to Russian, but Crimea is the exception, and not the rule. As 
shown in the case studies, South Ossetia and Abkhazia do not bend in every Russian 
wind, they tend to defy Moscow occasionally. Though they are dependent on Russia’s 
financial and military backing, the people of South Ossetia and Abkhazia do not 
necessarily crave Russian citizenship. The domestic Russian population also has a vote. 
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The thousands who gathered demonstrations in March 2015 after the murder of Boris 
Nemtsov were clearly upset about something.  
Russia does not exploit ethic conflict elegantly, like a doctor with a scalpel. 
Russia uses it like a blunt object, bashing their foes over the head, then jollily pointing 
out their deeds to a minority international and majority national audience. Recognizing 
South Ossetian and Abkhazian independence in 2008 was a mistake, only three other 
countries followed Russia’s lead (Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru). Following Crimea, 
Russia was expelled from the G8. These actions have produced little in exchange for 
Russia’s sacrifice. 
Russia’s exploitative policies will have limited effectiveness outside the former 
Soviet Bloc. The Baltic States, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan are all at risk of the same 
ethnic manipulation, though it not likely the world will see similar tactics used in the near 
or medium term. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania enjoy membership in both NATO and the 
EU. NATO will meet any influx of Russian insurgents and weapons along the hybrid 
warfare model of the Donbas crisis with armed force. Belarus remains safe as long as 
Alexander Lukashenko remains in power, but could be vulnerable after his departure. 
Kazakhstan’s native population is outgrowing its Russian minority by a large margin, and 
its government has undertaken a program of volunteer internal migration, moving ethnic 
Kazakhs to areas with large Russian populations.253 
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The common worldwide perception is that Western, Georgian, and Ukrainian 
policymakers have been completely unprepared to respond to Russian actions in its “near 
abroad.” Though this point has some merit, the intent of this thesis is to show that while 
Russia’s exploitation of ethnic division is systemic, it is not unstoppable. Leaders in the 
West, as well as Georgia and Ukraine, can implement numerous policies to counter 
subversive Russian strategic methods. 
                                                 
253 Paul Goble, “Astana Shifting Ethnic Kazakhs to Northern Kazakhstan to Block Any Russian 
Threat,” Window on Eurasia, April 4, 2014, http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2014/04/window-on-
eurasia-astana-shifting.html. 
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1. For Western Policymakers 
Given Russia’s obvious tendencies to use and abuse international law, engage in 
realist discourse, and treat its “near abroad” with open contempt, the move to invite 
Ukraine and Georgia into a closer relationship with Europe and the West should have 
been tempered. The United States and its European partners could have achieved their 
normative goals, such as the spread of democracy and normalization of markets, without 
unilaterally declaring Ukraine and Georgia inevitable members of Western institutions, 
thus giving Russia the pretext needed to enflame ethnic conflict. 
In the future, proactive Western action can limit the effectiveness of Russia’s war 
on ethnicity and identity, but it would entail a decidedly non-military approach to 
strategy. Strengthening of Georgia, Ukraine, and other post-Soviet states’ sense of civic 
nationalism, over regional or ethnic nationalism, is the single best means of preventing 
further Russian interference. But, achieving such a state is easier said than done, and 
could take years, if not decades, of competent civic leadership. By conquering corruption 
and championing reform, countries in the post-Soviet space can strengthen their sense of 
civic pride; this is an area where future Western aid should focus. Georgia and Ukraine 
have both began to tackle corruption and government waste, and have had peaceful 
transferences of power, so there is some momentum for internal change. 
Ultimately the most powerful actor in the region is still Russia. No other entity 
has the same level of interest in the European portion of the post-Soviet space. If the 
situation in Russia destabilizes disastrously, NATO must stand ready to respond to future 
hybrid threats. Putin may try to boost his popularity by once again inciting Russian 
patriotism, the quickest way of which would be uniting another group of “lost” Russians 
with the Russian Federation. Russia has clearly demonstrated that it does not intend to 
align to the Western way of the world. Though Russia has succeeded in the near term 
with what appear to be fewer negative repercussions, few paths toward a fruitful future 
remain. NATO must be prepared for the possibility of not only a revisionist Russia, but a 
massive collapsed state. 
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Putin’s strategy in his “near abroad” also remains consistent in its dependence on 
the continuing supplication of its neighbors to Moscow’s will. In Moscow’s modern 
worldview, Russia is always the victim: there must be some pretext to intervention. The 
better the pretext, the more legal ground countries like Russia have to interfere in foreign 
policy. Without a pretext, Russia cannot go in shooting. Such an action, at least in 
Russia’s eyes, would result in decisive Western action. This gives the West an 
opportunity to shape events by being proactive in the region, and denying any attempts 
for Russia to claim casus belli. The general approach in Washington is to appease Russia 
by trying to find a common ground, but this approach is not sustainable as Russia’s 
international goals of great power status and regional hegemony are not compatible with 
the current status quo which the U.S. and Europe is seeking to uphold. Instead the West 
should send clear diplomatic, military, and economic messages to the Russian 
government that their provocative actions will be met with decisive action. 
It is also critical for Western policymakers to confront Russia’s role as a mediator 
in Georgian and Ukrainian negotiations. Instead of viewing Russia as a concerned 
outsider, Western powers should refer to their representation at the negotiation table as 
one of the belligerents in an armed conflict, straightforwardly and unrelentingly. 
Evidence of their instigation of both crisis, as shown in this thesis and in countless other 
journalistic and academic publications, is overwhelming and unquestionable, it is 
therefore procedurally incorrect to treat Russia as a mediator. The country clearly has no 
interest in compromise. 
2. For Georgian and Ukrainian Policymakers
Georgia’s secessionist regions may be all but lost to Russian influence, as no 
solution appears immediately apparent; however, there is room to use the lessons learned 
in the Georgian case and apply them to other potential conflict zones around Russia’s 
periphery. Obviously Russia’s annexation of Crimea exemplifies a modified and evolved 
dimension to its exploitation of ethnic division, but it is too late to change the outcome of 
the 2014 Anschluss. Ukrainian leaders may be able to learn from the Georgian case, and 
apply these historical lessons to the ongoing conflict in the Donbas. Once a level of 
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stability establishes itself in the region, Ukrainian leaders can act to counter two of 
Russia’s strategies, that of peacekeeping (or piece-keeping) and identity manipulation. 
Unfortunately, one can apply few lessons from Russia’s direct military interference in the 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia conflicts and apply those to the Ukrainian case. Russia is 
simply too powerful and controls too much of the Ukrainian side of the Russo-Ukrainian 
border to prevent continued Russian military assistance. Obviously, military operations 
must first run their course. Only after Ukraine, Luhansk and Donetsk establish their 
dividing lines can Ukraine regain the initiative. As long as Russian-backed separatists 
and pro-Ukrainian forces remain engaged in active combat operations, little can be done 
to limit Russia’s exploitation of the conflict. 
Russia froze the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia primarily through their 
control of peacekeeping forces in both regions. They established a status quo where 
Russian forces, and their secessionist proxies, outnumbered Georgian forces. Any peace 
deal struck to bring a more-permanent end to fighting in the Donbas must be negotiated 
with this reality in mind. Russian direct influence in any peacekeeping process causes a 
dramatic decline in the possibility of eventual agreement. Ukrainian negotiators must do 
everything they can to stave off the legal stationing of Russian peacekeeping forces in 
Ukrainian territory. The Donetsk and Luhansk Republics and their armed forces are 
unlikely to willingly lay down their arms, but as long as Russian peacekeepers are kept 
off of Ukrainian territory, the Ukrainian government has a chance of avoiding a status 
quo situation where citizens of the Donbas grow accustomed to continued Russian armed 
presence, such as that which developed in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. 
Diminishing the power and strength of Russia’s coercive tactics should be another 
key Ukrainian goal following the secession of armed conflict. In the Georgian case, the 
Putin regime was able to continue to support Abkhazia and South Ossetia after relative 
stability was established. This military, economic, and political aid served to bind the 
breakaway regions closer to Russia, making them entirely dependent on Russia. 
Ukrainian officials should do all they can to limit Russian military support of the Donbas, 
and secure their own borders if possible. Economically, Ukraine should spearhead the 
reconstruction of the Donbas, and take the lead on repairing the devastation there. With 
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Western help, this could undermine Russian efforts to appear as the guarantor of 
economic aid. Finally, Ukraine should take every step to limit Russian efforts to absorb 
the Donbas civically. Kyiv should carefully monitor the issuance of passports, and 
circumvent Russian attempts at issuing their own passports to Ukrainian citizens at every 
opportunity. This once again counts on Ukraine’s ability to secure its own borders and 
prevent the infiltration of Russian passport-issuing bureaucrats. 
D. FINAL THOUGHTS 
There are numerous reasons to be optimistic about the future of humanity. More 
people have been lifted out of poverty in the last quarter century than at any other time in 
history. Advances in telecommunication technology have linked essentially every person 
on the planet to each other, allowing near simultaneous communication to every corner of 
the globe. But despite these revolutions, humanity cannot escape certain simple truths: 
one society tends to distrust another that does not look, talk, or behave like it. There will 
always be an “us versus them” mentality in the human condition. Instead of ignoring this 
truth, world leaders should seek out ways to prevent the calamities that take place 
because of this lack of trust. They should find ways to understand and minimize needless 
violence, because, unfortunately, there will always be those that will exploit what makes 
humanity diverse. There will always be those that manipulate what humanity is to 
achieve their own nefarious goals. To make a better world, global leaders must strive to 
understand the motivations behind ethnic conflict, and counter those that manipulate it. 
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